V'CER: Efficient Certificate Validation in Constrained Networks
David Koisser, Patrick Jauernig, Gene Tsudik, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
摘要
We address the challenging problem of efficient trust establishment in constrained networks, i.e., networks that are composed of a large and dynamic set of (possibly heterogeneous) devices with limited bandwidth, connectivity, storage, and computational capabilities. Constrained networks are an integral part of many emerging application domains, from IoT meshes to satellite networks. A particularly difficult challenge is how to enforce timely revocation of compromised or faulty devices. Unfortunately, current solutions and techniques cannot cope with idiosyncrasies of constrained networks, since they mandate frequent real-time communication with centralized entities, storage and maintenance of large amounts of revocation information, and incur considerable bandwidth overhead. To address the shortcomings of existing solutions, we design V'CER, a secure and efficient scheme for certificate validation that augments and benefits a PKI for constrained networks. V'CER utilizes unique features of Sparse Merkle Trees (SMTs) to perform lightweight revocation checks, while enabling collaborative operations among devices to keep them up-to-date when connectivity to external authorities is limited. V'CER can complement any PKI scheme to increase its flexibility and applicability, while ensuring fast dissemination of validation information independent of the network routing or topology. V'CER requires under 3KB storage per node covering 106 certificates. We developed and deployed a prototype of V'CER on an in-orbit satellite and our large-scale simulations demonstrate that V'CER decreases the number of requests for updates from external authorities by over 93%, when nodes are intermittently connected.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper2
相关 Paper
- EVOKE: Efficient Revocation of Verifiable Credentials in IoT NetworksCarlo Mazzocca, Abbas Acar, A. Selcuk Uluagac, Rebecca MontanariUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 22 次
- On-device IoT Certificate Revocation Checking with Small Memory and Low LatencyXiaofeng Shi, Shouqian Shi, Minmei Wang, Jonne Kaunisto 等CCS 2021 · 被引用 18 次
- Compact Certificates of Collective KnowledgeSilvio Micali, Leonid Reyzin, Georgios Vlachos, Riad S. Wahby 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 15 次
- The Locality of Memory CheckingWeijie Wang, Yujie Lu, Charalampos Papamanthou, Fan ZhangCCS 2023 · 被引用 5 次
- AccuRevoke: Enhancing Certificate Revocation with Distributed Cryptographic AccumulatorsMunshi Rejwan Ala Muid, Taejoong Chung, Thang HoangS&P 2025
