Let's Revoke: Scalable Global Certificate Revocation
Trevor Smith, Luke Dickenson, Kent E. Seamons
摘要
—Current revocation strategies have numerous issues that prevent their widespread adoption and use, including scalability, privacy, and new infrastructure requirements. Consequently, revocation is often ignored, leaving clients vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. This paper presents Let’s Revoke, a scalable global revocation strategy that addresses the concerns of current revocation checking. Let’s Revoke introduces a new unique identifier to each certificate that serves as an index to a dynamically-sized bit vector containing revocation status information. The bit vector approach enables significantly more efficient revocation checking for both clients and certificate authorities. We compare Let’s Revoke to existing revocation schemes and show that it requires less storage and network bandwidth than other systems, including those that cover only a fraction of the global certificate space. We further demonstrate through simulations that Let’s Revoke scales linearly up to ten billion certificates, even during mass revocation events.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper10
- Private Blocklist Lookups with ChecklistDmitry Kogan, Henry Corrigan-GibbsUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 104 次
- EVOKE: Efficient Revocation of Verifiable Credentials in IoT NetworksCarlo Mazzocca, Abbas Acar, A. Selcuk Uluagac, Rebecca MontanariUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 22 次
- On-device IoT Certificate Revocation Checking with Small Memory and Low LatencyXiaofeng Shi, Shouqian Shi, Minmei Wang, Jonne Kaunisto 等CCS 2021 · 被引用 18 次
- Rusted Anchors: A National Client-Side View of Hidden Root CAs in the Web PKI EcosystemYiming Zhang, Baojun Liu, Chaoyi Lu, Zhou Li 等CCS 2021 · 被引用 16 次
- CTng: Secure Certificate and Revocation TransparencyJie Kong, James Damon, Hemi Leibowitz, Ewa Syta 等NDSS 2026 · 被引用 5 次
它引用的顶会 Paper3
- Let's Encrypt: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire WebJosh Aas, Richard Barnes, Benton Case, Zakir Durumeric 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 138 次
- CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing All TLS Revocations to All BrowsersJames Larisch, David R. Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 105 次
- Tracking Certificate Misissuance in the WildDeepak Kumar, Zhengping Wang, Matthew Hyder, Joseph Dickinson 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 86 次
相关 Paper
- AccuRevoke: Enhancing Certificate Revocation with Distributed Cryptographic AccumulatorsMunshi Rejwan Ala Muid, Taejoong Chung, Thang HoangS&P 2025
- Reliable and Decentralized Certificate Revocation via DNS: The Case for RevDNSTaejoong Chung, Dave Levin, Protick BhowmickSIGCOMM 2025 · 被引用 2 次
- How Effective is Multiple-Vantage-Point Domain Control Validation?Grace H. Cimaszewski, Henry Birge-Lee, Liang Wang, Jennifer Rexford 等USENIX Security 2023
- Let's Downgrade Let's EncryptTianxiang Dai, Haya Schulmann, Michael WaidnerCCS 2021 · 被引用 16 次
- Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at Let's EncryptHenry Birge-Lee, Liang Wang, Daniel McCarney, Roland Shoemaker 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 23 次
