Let's Encrypt: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
Josh Aas, Richard Barnes, Benton Case, Zakir Durumeric, Peter Eckersley, Alan Flores-López, J. Alex Halderman, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, James Kasten, Eric Rescorla, Seth D. Schoen, Brad Warren
摘要
Let's Encrypt is a free, open, and automated HTTPS certificate authority (CA) created to advance HTTPS adoption to the entire Web. Since its launch in late 2015, Let's Encrypt has grown to become the world's largest HTTPS CA, accounting for more currently valid certificates than all other browser-trusted CAs combined. By January 2019, it had issued over 538 million certificates for 223 million domain names. We describe how we built Let's Encrypt, including the architecture of the CA software system (Boulder) and the structure of the organization that operates it (ISRG), and we discuss lessons learned from the experience. We also describe the design of ACME, the IETF-standard protocol we created to automate CA--server interactions and certificate issuance, and survey the diverse ecosystem of ACME clients, including Certbot, a software agent we created to automate HTTPS deployment. Finally, we measure Let's Encrypt's impact on the Web and the CA ecosystem. We hope that the success of Let's Encrypt can provide a model for further enhancements to the Web PKI and for future Internet security infrastructure.
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引用它的顶会 Paper18
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- CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing All TLS Revocations to All BrowsersJames Larisch, David R. Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 105 次
- Tracking Certificate Misissuance in the WildDeepak Kumar, Zhengping Wang, Matthew Hyder, Joseph Dickinson 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 86 次
- Bamboozling Certificate Authorities with BGPHenry Birge-Lee, Yixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Jennifer Rexford 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 83 次
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