Orbital Trust and Privacy: SoK on PKI and Location Privacy Challenges in Space Networks
David Koisser, Richard Mitev, Nikita Yadav, Franziska Vollmer, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
摘要
The dynamic evolution of the space sector, often referred to as "New Space," has led to increased commercialization and innovation. This transformation is characterized by a surge in satellite numbers, the emergence of small, cost-effective satellites like CubeSats, and the development of space networks. As satellite networks play an increasingly vital role in providing essential services and supporting various activities, ensuring their security is crucial, especially concerning trust relationships among satellites and the protection of satellite service users. Satellite networks possess unique characteristics, such as orbital dynamics, delays, and limited bandwidth, posing challenges to trust and privacy. While prior research has explored various aspects of space network security, this paper systematically investigates two crucial yet unexplored dimensions: (i) The integrity of PKI components directly impacts the security and privacy of satellite communications and data transmission, with orbital delays and disruptions potentially hindering timely certificate revocation checks. (ii) Conversely, transmitting user signals to satellites requires careful consideration to prevent location tracking and unauthorized surveillance. By drawing on insights from terrestrial studies, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of these intertwined security aspects, identify research gaps, and stimulate further exploration to tackle these research challenges in the evolving domain of space network security.
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引用它的顶会 Paper2
- LPG: Raise Your Location Privacy Game in Direct-to-Cell LEO Satellite NetworksQuan Shi, Liying Wang, Prosanta Gope, Qi Liang 等USENIX Security 2026
- SoK: Space Infrastructures Vulnerabilities, Attacks and DefensesJose Luis Castanon Remy, Ekzhin Ear, Caleb Chang, Antonia Feffer 等S&P 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper4
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- Don't Shoot the Messenger: Localization Prevention of Satellite Internet UsersDavid Koisser, Richard Mitev, Marco Chilese, Ahmad-Reza SadeghiS&P 2024 · 被引用 11 次
- Space Odyssey: An Experimental Software Security Analysis of SatellitesJohannes Willbold, Moritz Schloegel, Manuel Vögele, Maximilian Gerhardt 等S&P 2023
- V'CER: Efficient Certificate Validation in Constrained NetworksDavid Koisser, Patrick Jauernig, Gene Tsudik, Ahmad-Reza SadeghiUSENIX Security 2022
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