AutoRFM: Scaling Low-Cost in-DRAM Trackers to Ultra-Low Rowhammer Thresholds
Moinuddin Qureshi
Abstract
In-DRAM Rowhammer mitigation has the potential to solve the Rowhammer problem without relying on other parts of the system. In-DRAM mitigation requires space (to identify the aggressor rows) and time (to perform the victim refresh). To reduce the storage overheads of tracking, recent works have developed secure low-cost in-DRAM trackers that can probabilistically identify aggressor rows. To obtain the time required for mitigation, these trackers rely on the Refresh Management (RFM) command introduced in DDR5. As RFM stalls the bank for a latency of 200ns-400ns, frequent use of RFM can cause significant slowdowns. For example, scaling the recent MINT tracker to a threshold of 100 incurs 33% slowdown. The goal of this paper is to enable low-cost trackers to tolerate ultralow thresholds (sub-100) while incurring negligible slowdown.
This paper proposes AutoRFM, a transparent RFM mechanism that can provide mitigation time to the DRAM chips without stalling the bank. The key insight in AutoRFM is to leverage the subarray structure (e.g. each bank contains 256 subarrays) and perform mitigation on only one of the subarrays. Operations to all subarrays that are not under mitigation are serviced without any interruption. If activation occurs to the subarray under mitigation, the DRAM chip sends an ALERT signal informing the Memory Controller to retry after a predefined time. As AutoRFM works best if consecutive requests to the same bank do not get mapped to the same subarray, we use Randomized Memory Mapping to break the spatial correlation between memory accesses. Furthermore, we also develop a Fractal Mitigation Algorithm that can tolerate transitive attacks (such as Half-Double) without requiring recursive mitigations to the same subarray. Our design ensures that a declined request does not have to wait more than 200 ns before retrying, thus limiting the slowdown and avoiding any potential for denial of service. Our evaluations, with SPEC, GAP, and stream workloads, show that AutoRFM enables low-cost trackers to tolerate a threshold of as low as 74 while incurring an average slowdown of only 3.1%. Row Row Row Ref Track In-DRAM Mitigation Ref Goal Slowdown 30% 0% 800 Threshold over time 400 200 100 50
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext aff9e946-c22a-47e8-9579-7e153cced3edCited by top-tier papers10
- Chronus: Understanding and Securing the Cutting-Edge Industry Solutions to DRAM Read DisturbanceOguzhan Canpolat, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Ataberk Olgun et al.HPCA 2025 · 23 citations
- ColumnDisturb: Understanding Column-based Read Disturbance in Real DRAM Chips and Implications for Future SystemsIsmail Emir Yuksel, Ataberk Olgun, Nisa Bostanci, Haocong Luo et al.MICRO 2025 · 15 citations
- DREAM: Enabling Low-Overhead Rowhammer Mitigation via Directed Refresh ManagementHritvik Taneja, Moinuddin K. QureshiISCA 2025 · 9 citations
- Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer DefensesF. Nisa Bostanci, Oguzhan Canpolat, Ataberk Olgun, Ismail Emir Yüksel et al.MICRO 2025 · 8 citations
- When Mitigations Backfire: Timing Channel Attacks and Defense for PRAC-Based RowHammer MitigationsJeonghyun Woo, Joyce Qu, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant Jayaprakash NairISCA 2025 · 6 citations
Builds on33
- Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile PlatformsVictor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss et al.CCS 2016 · 381 citations
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2018 · 288 citations
- TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row RefreshPietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen et al.S&P 2020 · 274 citations
- RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing ThemAndrew Kwong, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Yuval YaromS&P 2020 · 239 citations
- Exploiting Correcting Codes: On the Effectiveness of ECC Memory Against Rowhammer AttacksLucian Cojocar, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert BosS&P 2019 · 233 citations
Related papers
- MINT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with a Minimalist in-DRAM TrackerMoinuddin Qureshi, Salman Qazi, Aamer JaleelMICRO 2024 · 28 citations
- PrIDE: Achieving Secure Rowhammer Mitigation with Low-Cost In-DRAM TrackersAamer Jaleel, Gururaj Saileshwar, Stephen W. Keckler, Moinuddin K. QureshiISCA 2024 · 22 citations
- APT: Securing Against DRAM Read Disturbance via Adaptive Probabilistic In-DRAM TrackersRunjin Wu, Meng Zhang, You Zhou, Changsheng Xie et al.ASPLOS 2026 · 2 citations
- Hydra: enabling low-overhead mitigation of row-hammer at ultra-low thresholds via hybrid trackingMoinuddin K. Qureshi, Aditya Rohan, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant J. NairISCA 2022 · 60 citations
- DAPPER: A Performance-Attack-Resilient Tracker for RowHammer DefenseJeonghyun Woo, Prashant J. NairHPCA 2025 · 10 citations
