MoPAC: Efficiently Mitigating Rowhammer with Probabilistic Activation Counting
Suhas Vittal, Salman Qazi, Poulami Das, Moinuddin Qureshi
Abstract
Rowhammer has worsened over the last decade. Existing in-DRAM solutions, such as TRR, were broken with simple patterns. In response, the recent DDR5 JEDEC standards modify the DRAM array to enable Per-Row Activation Counters (PRAC) for tracking aggressor rows. They also extend the DRAM timings to support the operations required to update the PRAC counters. Unfortunately, the increased memory timings cause significant performance overheads (on average 10%) even for benign applications and even at current Rowhammer thresholds. The goal of this paper is to minimize the slowdown of PRAC while retaining the security benefits of PRAC.
This paper proposes Mitigating Rowhammer with Probabilistic Activation Counts (MoPAC), which reduces the slowdown of updating the PRAC counters by performing the updates probabilistically, thereby incurring the latency overhead of counter updates for only a small subset of activations. To ensure security in the presence of probabilistic counters, MOPAC adjusts the threshold at which the row undergoes mitigation. We propose two variants of MoPAC: MoPAC-C (Memory-Controller Side) and MoPAC-D (DRAM Side).
MoPAC-C relies on having two types of precharge commands: one that incurs normal latency and does not do counter updates, and the other that incurs higher latency and performs counter updates. MoPAC-C probabilistically chooses when the longer precharge must be used to perform update of the PRAC counter. MoPAC-D is a completely in-DRAM solution that probabilistically selects which activations will be selected for performing counter updates and obtains the time required for counter-updates using ALERT or REF. Our evaluations show that, for a Rowhammer threshold of 500 (10× lower than current thresholds), MoPAC-C and MoPAC-D incur an average slowdown of only 1.7% and 0.7%, much less than the 10% incurred by PRAC. MoPAC removes one of the major obstacles to the commercial adoption of PRAC.
• Security and privacy → Security in hardware.
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