USENIX Security2023Top-tier venue
DeResistor: Toward Detection-Resistant Probing for Evasion of Internet Censorship
Abderrahmen Amich, Birhanu Eshete, Vinod Yegneswaran, Nguyen Phong Hoang
Abstract
The arms race between Internet freedom advocates and censors has catalyzed the emergence of sophisticated blocking techniques and directed significant research emphasis toward the development of automated censorship measurement and evasion tools based on packet manipulation. However, we observe that the probing process of censorship middleboxes using state-of-the-art evasion tools can be easily fingerprinted by censors, necessitating detection-resilient probing techniques. We validate our hypothesis by developing a real-time detection approach that utilizes Machine Learning (ML) to detect flow-level packet-manipulation and an algorithm for IPlevel detection based on Threshold Random Walk (TRW). We then take the first steps toward detection-resilient censorship evasion by presenting DeResistor 1 , a system that facilitates detection-resilient probing for packet-manipulationbased censorship-evasion. DeResistor aims to defuse detection logic employed by censors by performing detectionguided pausing of censorship evasion attempts and interleaving them with normal user-driven network activity. We evaluate our techniques by leveraging Geneva, a state-of-the-art evasion strategy generator, and validate them against 11 simulated censors supplied by Geneva, while also testing them against real-world censors (i.e., China's Great Firewall (GFW), India and Kazakhstan). From an adversarial perspective, our proposed real-time detection method can quickly detect clients that attempt to probe censorship middleboxes with manipulated packets after inspecting only two probing flows. From a defense perspective, DeResistor is effective at shielding Geneva training from detection while enabling it to narrow the search space to produce less detectable traffic. Importantly, censorship evasion strategies generated using DeResistor can attain a high success rate from different vantage points against the GFW (up to 98%) and 100% in India and Kazakhstan. Finally, we discuss detection countermeasures and extensibility of our approach to other censor-probing-based tools. 1 Could also be thought of as a system that delays and distributes censorship probes similar to how a resistor regulates the flow of current.
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Cited by top-tier papers5
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- Global Measurement of DNS ManipulationPaul Pearce, Ben Jones, Frank Li, Roya Ensafi et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 163 citations
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- Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship ObservatoryRam Sundara Raman, Prerana Shenoy, Katharina Kohls, Roya EnsafiCCS 2020 · 68 citations
- Quack: Scalable Remote Measurement of Application-Layer CensorshipBenjamin VanderSloot, Allison McDonald, Will Scott, J. Alex Halderman et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 66 citations
- Come as You Are: Helping Unmodified Clients Bypass Censorship with Server-side EvasionKevin Bock, George Hughey, Louis-Henri Merino, Tania Arya et al.SIGCOMM 2020 · 17 citations
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