USENIX Security2018Top-tier venue
Quack: Scalable Remote Measurement of Application-Layer Censorship
Benjamin VanderSloot, Allison McDonald, Will Scott, J. Alex Halderman, Roya Ensafi
Abstract
Remote censorship measurement tools can now detect DNS-and IP-based blocking at global scale. However, a major unmonitored form of interference is blocking triggered by deep packet inspection of application-layer data. We close this gap by introducing Quack, a scalable, remote measurement system that can efficiently detect application-layer interference. We show that Quack can effectively detect applicationlayer blocking triggered on HTTP and TLS headers, and it is flexible enough to support many other diverse protocols. In experiments, we test for blocking across 4458 autonomous systems, an order of magnitude larger than provided by country probes used by OONI over a one week span. We also test a corpus of 100,000 keywords from vantage points in 40 countries to produce detailed national blocklists. Finally, we analyze the keywords we find blocked to provide insight into the application-layer blocking ecosystem and compare countries' behavior. We find that the most consistently blocked services are related to circumvention tools, pornography, and gambling, but that there is significant country-to-country variation.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 2237b5df-b310-4c15-91cd-71a042f62c66Cited by top-tier papers25
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