Geneva: Evolving Censorship Evasion Strategies
Kevin Bock, George Hughey, Xiao Qiang, Dave Levin
Abstract
Researchers and censoring regimes have long engaged in a cat-andmouse game, leading to increasingly sophisticated Internet-scale censorship techniques and methods to evade them. In this paper, we take a drastic departure from the previously manual evadedetect cycle by developing techniques to automate the discovery of censorship evasion strategies. We present Geneva, a novel genetic algorithm that evolves packet-manipulation-based censorship evasion strategies against nation-state level censors. Geneva composes, mutates, and evolves sophisticated strategies out of four basic packet manipulation primitives (drop, tamper headers, duplicate, and fragment). With experiments performed both in-lab and against several real censors (in China, India, and Kazakhstan), we demonstrate that Geneva is able to quickly and independently re-derive most strategies from prior work, and derive novel subspecies and altogether new species of packet manipulation strategies. Moreover, Geneva discovers successful strategies that prior work posited were not effective, and evolves extinct strategies into newly working variants. We analyze the novel strategies Geneva creates to infer previously unknown behavior in censors. Geneva is a first step towards automating censorship evasion; to this end, we have made our code and data publicly available. CCS CONCEPTS • Social and professional topics → Technology and censorship; • Computing methodologies → Genetic algorithms; • General and reference → Measurement.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 525a870d-48ea-4dcd-bdf3-19df69161bbfCited by top-tier papers12
- Chinese Wall or Swiss Cheese? Keyword filtering in the Great Firewall of ChinaZachary Weinberg, Diogo Barradas, Nicolas ChristinWWW 2021 · 33 citations
- Understanding the Impact of Encrypted DNS on Internet CensorshipLin Jin, Shuai Hao, Haining Wang, Chase CottonWWW 2021 · 29 citations
- Break the Wall from Bottom: Automated Discovery of Protocol-Level Evasion Vulnerabilities in Web Application FirewallsQi Wang, Jianjun Chen, Zheyu Jiang, Run Guo et al.S&P 2024 · 11 citations
- Themis: Ambiguity-Aware Network Intrusion Detection based on Symbolic Model ComparisonZhongjie Wang, Shitong Zhu, Keyu Man, Pengxiong Zhu et al.CCS 2021 · 6 citations
- Pryde: A Modular Generalizable Workflow for Uncovering Evasion Attacks Against Stateful Firewall DeploymentsSoo-Jin Moon, Milind Srivastava, Yves Bieri, Ruben Martins et al.S&P 2024 · 2 citations
Builds on2
Related papers
- Come as You Are: Helping Unmodified Clients Bypass Censorship with Server-side EvasionKevin Bock, George Hughey, Louis-Henri Merino, Tania Arya et al.SIGCOMM 2020 · 17 citations
- GET /out: Automated Discovery of Application-Layer Censorship Evasion StrategiesMichael Harrity, Kevin Bock, Frederick Sell, Dave LevinUSENIX Security 2022
- DeResistor: Toward Detection-Resistant Probing for Evasion of Internet CensorshipAbderrahmen Amich, Birhanu Eshete, Vinod Yegneswaran, Nguyen Phong HoangUSENIX Security 2023
- CircumVolve: Automated Discovery of Censorship Evasion Strategies Using Large Language ModelsAli Zohaib, Jackson Sippe, Jade Sheffey, Mingshi Wu et al.CCS 2026
- Censorship Evasion with Unidentified Protocol GenerationRyan Wails, Rob Jansen, Aaron Johnson, Micah SherrUSENIX Security 2025
