Self-Managing DRAM: A Low-Cost Framework for Enabling Autonomous and Efficient DRAM Maintenance Operations
Hasan Hassan, Ataberk Olgun, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Haocong Luo, Onur Mutlu
Abstract
The memory controller is in charge of managing DRAM maintenance operations (e.g., refresh, RowHammer protection, memory scrubbing) to reliably operate modern DRAM chips. Implementing new maintenance operations often necessitates modifications in the DRAM interface, memory controller, and potentially other system components. Such modifications are only possible with a new DRAM standard, which takes a long time to develop, likely leading to slow progress in the adoption of new architectural techniques in DRAM chips. We propose a new low-cost DRAM architecture, Self-Managing DRAM (SMD), that enables autonomous in-DRAM maintenance operations by transferring the responsibility for controlling main-tenance operations from the memory controller to the SMD chip. To enable autonomous maintenance operations, we make a single, simple modification to the DRAM interface, such that an SMD chip rejects memory controller accesses to DRAM regions (e.g., a subarray or a bank) under maintenance, while allowing memory accesses to other DRAM regions. Thus, SMD enables 1) implementing new in-DRAM maintenance mechanisms (or modifying existing ones) with no further changes in the DRAM interface, memory controller, or other system components, and 2) overlapping the latency of a maintenance operation in one DRAM region with the latency of accessing data in another. We evaluate SMD and show that it 1) can be implemented without adding new pins to the DDRx interface with low latency (0.4% of row activation latency) and area (1.1% of a 45.5 mm2 DRAM chip) overhead, 2) achieves 4.1 % average speedup across 20 four-core memory-intensive workloads over a DDR4-based system/-DRAM co-design technique that intelligently parallelizes main-tenance operations with memory accesses, and 3) guarantees for-ward progress for rejected memory accesses. We believe and hope SMD can enable innovations in DRAM architecture to rapidly come to fruition. We open source all SMD source code and data at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/SelfManagingDRAM.
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