The Betrayal At Cloud City: An Empirical Analysis Of Cloud-Based Mobile Backends
Omar Alrawi, Chaoshun Zuo, Ruian Duan, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Zhiqiang Lin, Brendan Saltaformaggio
摘要
Cloud backends provide essential features to the mobile app ecosystem, such as content delivery, ad networks, analytics, and more. Unfortunately, app developers often disregard or have no control over prudent security practices when choosing or managing these services. Our preliminary study of the top 5,000 Google Play Store free apps identified 983 instances of N-day and 655 instances of 0-day vulnerabilities spanning across the software layers (OS, software services, communication, and web apps) of cloud backends. The mobile apps using these cloud backends represent between 1M and 500M installs each and can potentially affect hundreds of thousands of users. Further, due to the widespread use of third-party SDKs, app developers are often unaware of the backends affecting their apps and where to report vulnerabilities. This paper presents SkyWalker, a pipeline to automatically vet the backends that mobile apps contact and provide actionable remediation. For an input APK, SkyWalker extracts an enumeration of backend URLs, uses remote vetting techniques to identify software vulnerabilities and responsible parties, and reports mitigation strategies to the app developer. Our findings suggest that developers and cloud providers do not have a clear understanding of responsibilities and liabilities in regards to mobile app backends that leave many vulnerabilities exposed. Introduction Cloud-based mobile backends provide a wide array of features, such as ad networks, analytics, content delivery, and much more. These features are supported by multiple layers of software and multiple parties including content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting providers, and cloud providers who offer virtual/physical hardware, provisioned operating systems, and managed platforms. Due to the inherent complexity of cloud-based backends, deploying and maintaining them securely is challenging. Consequently, *Authors contributed equally. mobile app developers often disregard prudent security practices when choosing cloud infrastructure, building, or renting these backends. Recent backend breaches of the British Airways [1] app and Air Canada [2] app demonstrate how wide-spread these incidents are. More recently, the hijacking of the Fortnite mobile game [3] showed how incrementally-downloaded content from mobile backends can allow an attacker to install additional mobile apps without the user's consent. Additional cases [4] involving the exposure of 43TB of enterprise customer names, email addresses, phone numbers, PIN reset tokens, device information, and password lengths was due to insecure mobile backends and not the developer's mobile app code. Even for security-conscious developers, it is not clear what backends their mobile app will interact with because of third-party libraries. Third-party libraries do not expose their backends to developers, instead, they offer an application program interface (API) that developers use. Many of these vulnerabilities can be identified ahead of time if developers have the right tools and resources to evaluate the security of their backends. Further, identifying vulnerable software layers and the responsible party can expedite remediation and therefore lower the risk of exposure. To deal with the complexities in cloud infrastructure, the research community surveyed [5] and proposed several taxonomies [6], ontologies [7], assessment models [8], and threat classifications [9] . Unfortunately, these approaches provide few practical recommendations for mobile app developers. Recent works on server-side vulnerability discovery of mobile apps [10]- [12] have shown that a lack of security awareness among app developers is a growing problem. Yet, these works only scratch the surface by examining only the software service layer of mobile backends. A systematic study is needed to identify the most pressing issues facing mobile backends. Moreover, to conduct such a study, the analysis must be reproducible, transparent, and easy to interpret for developers. The study should be done on a representative mobile app ecosystem to provide real in-
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper16
- The Circle Of Life: A Large-Scale Study of The IoT Malware LifecycleOmar Alrawi, Charles Lever, Kevin Valakuzhy, Ryan Court 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 109 次
- Automatic Fingerprinting of Vulnerable BLE IoT Devices with Static UUIDs from Mobile AppsChaoshun Zuo, Haohuang Wen, Zhiqiang Lin, Yinqian ZhangCCS 2019 · 被引用 77 次
- FirmXRay: Detecting Bluetooth Link Layer Vulnerabilities From Bare-Metal FirmwareHaohuang Wen, Zhiqiang Lin, Yinqian ZhangCCS 2020 · 被引用 47 次
- Automatic Uncovering of Hidden Behaviors From Input Validation in Mobile AppsQingchuan Zhao, Chaoshun Zuo, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Giancarlo Pellegrino 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 33 次
- Et tu, Brute? Privacy Analysis of Government Websites and Mobile AppsNayanamana Samarasinghe, Aashish Adhikari, Mohammad Mannan, Amr M. YoussefWWW 2022 · 被引用 24 次
它引用的顶会 Paper9
- Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home ApplicationsEarlence Fernandes, Jaeyeon Jung, Atul PrakashS&P 2016 · 被引用 684 次
- SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT DeploymentsOmar Alrawi, Chaz Lever, Manos Antonakakis, Fabian MonroseS&P 2019 · 被引用 411 次
- Reliable Third-Party Library Detection in Android and its Security ApplicationsMichael Backes, Sven Bugiel, Erik DerrCCS 2016 · 被引用 345 次
- You've Got Vulnerability: Exploring Effective Vulnerability NotificationsFrank Li, Zakir Durumeric, Jakub Czyz, Mohammad Karami 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 149 次
- SemFuzz: Semantics-based Automatic Generation of Proof-of-Concept ExploitsWei You, Peiyuan Zong, Kai Chen, XiaoFeng Wang 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 148 次
相关 Paper
- Why Does Your Data Leak? Uncovering the Data Leakage in Cloud from Mobile AppsChaoshun Zuo, Zhiqiang Lin, Yinqian ZhangS&P 2019 · 被引用 123 次
- Keep me Updated: An Empirical Study of Third-Party Library Updatability on AndroidErik Derr, Sven Bugiel, Sascha Fahl, Yasemin Acar 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 196 次
- Component Security Ten Years Later: An Empirical Study of Cross-Layer Threats in Real-World Mobile ApplicationsKeke Lian, Lei Zhang, Guangliang Yang, Shuo Mao 等FSE 2024 · 被引用 5 次
- Understanding Open Ports in Android Applications: Discovery, Diagnosis, and Security AssessmentDaoyuan Wu, Debin Gao, Rocky K. C. Chang, En He 等NDSS 2019 · 被引用 25 次
- Your Phone is My Proxy: Detecting and Understanding Mobile Proxy NetworksXianghang Mi, Siyuan Tang, Zhengyi Li, Xiaojing Liao 等NDSS 2021
