Your Phone is My Proxy: Detecting and Understanding Mobile Proxy Networks
Xianghang Mi, Siyuan Tang, Zhengyi Li, Xiaojing Liao, Feng Qian, XiaoFeng Wang
摘要
—Residential proxy has emerged as a service gaining popularity recently, in which proxy providers relay their customers’ network traffic through millions of proxy peers under their control. We find that many of these proxy peers are mobile devices, whose role in the proxy network can have significant security implications since mobile devices tend to be privacy-and resource-sensitive. However, little effort has been made so far to understand the extent of their involvement, not to mention how these devices are recruited by the proxy network and what security and privacy risks they may pose. In this paper, we report the first measurement study on the mobile proxy ecosystem. Our study was made possible by a novel measurement infrastructure, which enabled us to identify proxy providers, to discover proxy SDKs (software development kits), to detect Android proxy apps built upon the proxy SDKs, to harvest proxy IP addresses, and to understand proxy traffic. The information collected through this infrastructure has brought to us new understandings of this ecosystem and important security discoveries. More specifically, 4 proxy providers were found to offer app developers mobile proxy SDKs as a competitive app monetization channel, with $50K per month per 1M MAU (monthly active users). 1,701 Android APKs (belonging to 963 Android apps) turn out to have integrated those proxy SDKs, with most of them available on Google Play with at least 300M installations in total. Furthermore, 48.43% of these APKs are flagged by at least 5 anti-virus engines as malicious, which could explain why 86.60% of the 963 Android apps have been removed from Google Play by Oct 2019. Besides, while these apps display user consent dialogs on traffic relay, our user study indicates that the
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引用它的顶会 Paper4
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- Beyond The Gates: An Empirical Analysis of HTTP-Managed Password Stealers and OperatorsAthanasios Avgetidis, Omar Alrawi, Kevin Valakuzhy, Charles Lever 等USENIX Security 2023
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- Reliable Third-Party Library Detection in Android and its Security ApplicationsMichael Backes, Sven Bugiel, Erik DerrCCS 2016 · 被引用 345 次
- Resident Evil: Understanding Residential IP Proxy as a Dark ServiceXianghang Mi, Xuan Feng, Xiaojing Liao, Baojun Liu 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 80 次
- Experiences of landing machine learning onto market-scale mobile malware detectionLiangyi Gong, Zhenhua Li, Feng Qian, Zifan Zhang 等EuroSys 2020 · 被引用 44 次
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