GAROTA: Generalized Active Root-Of-Trust Architecture (for Tiny Embedded Devices)
Esmerald Aliaj, Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Gene Tsudik
摘要
Embedded (aka smart or IoT) devices are increasingly popular and becoming ubiquitous. Unsurprisingly, they are also attractive attack targets for exploits and malware. Low-end embedded devices, designed with strict cost, size, and energy limitations, are especially challenging to secure, given their lack of resources to implement sophisticated security services, available on higher-end computing devices. To this end, several tiny Roots-of-Trust (RoTs) were proposed to enable services, such as remote verification of device's software state and run-time integrity. Such RoTs operate reactively: they can prove whether a desired action (e.g., software update or program execution) was performed on a specific device. However, they can not guarantee that a desired action will be performed, since malware controlling the device can trivially block access to the RoT by ignoring/discarding received commands and other trigger events. This is an important problem because it allows malware to effectively "brick" or incapacitate a potentially huge number of (possibly mission-critical) devices. Though recent work made progress in terms of incorporating more active behavior atop existing RoTs, much of it relies on extensive hardware support in the form of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), which are generally too costly for low-end devices. In this paper, we set out to systematically design a minimal active RoT for low-end MCU-s. We begin with three questions: (1) What functionality is required to guarantee actions in the presence of malware? (2) How to implement this efficiently? and (3) What are the security benefits of such an active RoT architecture? We then design, implement, formally verify, and evaluate GAROTA : Generalized Active Root-Of-Trust Architecture. We believe that GAROTA is the first clean-slate design of an active RoT for low-end MCU-s. We show how GAROTA guarantees that even a fully softwarecompromised low-end MCU performs a desired action. We demonstrate its practicality by implementing GAROTA in the context of three types of applications where actions are triggered by: sensing hardware, network events and timers. We also formally specify and verify GAROTA functionality and properties.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- PEARTS: Provable Execution in Real-Time Embedded SystemsAntonio Joia Neto, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Ivan De Oliveira NunesS&P 2025
- ACFA: Secure Runtime Auditing & Guaranteed Device Healing via Active Control Flow AttestationAdam Caulfield, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Ivan De Oliveira NunesUSENIX Security 2023
- IDA: Hybrid Attestation with Support for Interrupts and TOCTOUFatemeh Arkannezhad, Justin Feng, Nader SehatbakhshNDSS 2024
它引用的顶会 Paper8
- IoTFuzzer: Discovering Memory Corruptions in IoT Through App-based FuzzingJiongyi Chen, Wenrui Diao, Qingchuan Zhao, Chaoshun Zuo 等NDSS 2018 · 被引用 311 次
- C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems SoftwareTigist Abera, N. Asokan, Lucas Davi, Jan-Erik Ekberg 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 311 次
- VRASED: A Verified Hardware/Software Co-Design for Remote AttestationIvan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Michael Steiner 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 135 次
- OAT: Attesting Operation Integrity of Embedded DevicesZhichuang Sun, Bo Feng, Long Lu, Somesh JhaS&P 2020 · 被引用 89 次
- Dominance as a New Trusted Computing Primitive for the Internet of ThingsMeng Xu, Manuel Huber, Zhichuang Sun, Paul England 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 61 次
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