Caveat (IoT) Emptor: Towards Transparency of IoT Device Presence
Sashidhar Jakkamsetti, Youngil Kim, Gene Tsudik
摘要
As many types of IoT devices worm their way into numerous settings and many aspects of our daily lives, awareness of their presence and functionality becomes a source of major concern. Hidden IoT devices can snoop (via sensing) on nearby unsuspecting users, and impact the environment where unaware users are present, via actuation. This prompts, respectively, privacy and security/safety issues. The dangers of hidden IoT devices have been recognized and prior research suggested some means of mitigation, mostly based on traffic analysis or using specialized hardware to uncover devices. While such approaches are partially effective, there is currently no comprehensive approach to IoT device transparency. Prompted in part by recent privacy regulations (GDPR and CCPA), this paper motivates and constructs a privacy-agile Rootof-Trust architecture for IoT devices, called PAISA: Privacy-agile IoT Sensing and Actuation. It guarantees timely and secure announcements about IoT devices' presence and their capabilities. PAISA has two components: one on the IoT device that guarantees periodic announcements of its presence even if all device software is compromised, and the other that runs on the user device, which captures and processes announcements. Notably, PAISA requires no hardware modifications; it uses a popular off-the-shelf Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) -ARM TrustZone. This work also comprises a fully functional (open-sourced) prototype implementation of PAISA, which includes: an IoT device that makes announcements via IEEE 802.11 WiFi beacons and an Android smartphone-based app that captures and processes announcements. Both security and performance of PAISA design and prototype are discussed. * 'Caveat Emptor" is Latin for "User Beware".
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