Dominance as a New Trusted Computing Primitive for the Internet of Things
Meng Xu, Manuel Huber, Zhichuang Sun, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, Sangho Lee, Andrey Marochko, Dennis Mattoon, Rob Spiger, Stefan Thom
摘要
The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly emerging as one of the dominant computing paradigms of this decade. Applications range from in-home entertainment to large-scale industrial deployments such as controlling assembly lines and monitoring traffic. While IoT devices are in many respects similar to traditional computers, user expectations and deployment scenarios as well as cost and hardware constraints are sufficiently different to create new security challenges as well as new opportunities. This is especially true for large-scale IoT deployments in which a central entity deploys and controls a large number of IoT devices with minimal human interaction. Like traditional computers, IoT devices are subject to attack and compromise. Large IoT deployments consisting of many nearly identical devices are especially attractive targets. At the same time, recovery from root compromise by conventional means becomes costly and slow, even more so if the devices are dispersed over a large geographical area. In the worst case, technicians have to travel to all devices and manually recover them. Data center solutions such as the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) which rely on separate service processors and network connections are not only not supported by existing IoT hardware, but are unlikely to be in the foreseeable future due to the cost constraints of mainstream IoT devices. This paper presents Cider, a system that can recover IoT devices within a short amount of time, even if attackers have taken root control of every device in a large deployment. The recovery requires minimal manual intervention. After the administrator has identified the compromise and produced an updated firmware image, he/she can instruct Cider to force the devices to reset and to install the patched firmware on the devices. We demonstrate the universality and practicality of Cider by implementing it on three popular IoT platforms (HummingBoard Edge, Raspberry Pi Compute Module 3 and Nucleo-L476RG) spanning the range from high to low end. Our evaluation shows that the performance overhead of Cider is generally negligible.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper10
- HARDLOG: Practical Tamper-Proof System Auditing Using a Novel Audit DeviceAdil Ahmad, Sangho Lee, Marcus PeinadoS&P 2022 · 被引用 46 次
- DICE*: A Formally Verified Implementation of DICE Measured BootZhe Tao, Aseem Rastogi, Naman Gupta, Kapil Vaswani 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 25 次
- OPEC: operation-based security isolation for bare-metal embedded systemsXia Zhou, Jiaqi Li, Wenlong Zhang, Yajin Zhou 等EuroSys 2022 · 被引用 18 次
- Core slicing: closing the gap between leaky confidential VMs and bare-metal cloudZiqiao Zhou, Yizhou Shan, Weidong Cui, Xinyang Ge 等OSDI 2023 · 被引用 12 次
- Perils and Mitigation of Security Risks of Cooperation in Mobile-as-a-Gateway IoTXin'an Zhou, Jiale Guan, Luyi Xing, Zhiyun QianCCS 2022 · 被引用 9 次
它引用的顶会 Paper11
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Understanding the Mirai BotnetManos Antonakakis, Tim April, Michael D. Bailey, Matt Bernhard 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 2,003 次
- Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,175 次
- SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT DeploymentsOmar Alrawi, Chaz Lever, Manos Antonakakis, Fabian MonroseS&P 2019 · 被引用 411 次
- BlackIoT: IoT Botnet of High Wattage Devices Can Disrupt the Power GridSaleh Soltan, Prateek Mittal, H. Vincent PoorUSENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 348 次
相关 Paper
- Capture: Centralized Library Management for Heterogeneous IoT DevicesHan Zhang, Abhijith Anilkumar, Matt Fredrikson, Yuvraj AgarwalUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 18 次
- A Friend's Eye is A Good Mirror: Synthesizing MCU Peripheral Models from Peripheral DriversChongqing Lei, Zhen Ling, Yue Zhang, Yan Yang 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 8 次
- Landing Reinforcement Learning onto Smart Scanning of The Internet of ThingsJian Qu, Xiaobo Ma, Wenmao Liu, Hongqing Sang 等INFOCOM 2022 · 被引用 9 次
- IoTFuzzer: Discovering Memory Corruptions in IoT Through App-based FuzzingJiongyi Chen, Wenrui Diao, Qingchuan Zhao, Chaoshun Zuo 等NDSS 2018 · 被引用 311 次
- Pandawan: Quantifying Progress in Linux-based Firmware RehostingIoannis Angelakopoulos, Gianluca Stringhini, Manuel EgeleUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 5 次
