Detecting Attacks Against Robotic Vehicles: A Control Invariant Approach
Hongjun Choi, Wen-Chuan Lee, Yousra Aafer, Fan Fei, Zhan Tu, Xiangyu Zhang, Dongyan Xu, Xinyan Deng
Abstract
Robotic vehicles (RVs), such as drones and ground rovers, are a type of cyber-physical systems that operate in the physical world under the control of computing components in the cyber world. Despite RVs' robustness against natural disturbances, cyber or physical attacks against RVs may lead to physical malfunction and subsequently disruption or failure of the vehicles' missions. To avoid or mitigate such consequences, it is essential to develop attack detection techniques for RVs. In this paper, we present a novel attack detection framework to identify external, physical attacks against RVs on the fly by deriving and monitoring Control Invariants (CI). More specifically, we propose a method to extract such invariants by jointly modeling a vehicle's physical properties, its control algorithm and the laws of physics. These invariants are represented in a state-space form, which can then be implemented and inserted into the vehicle's control program binary for runtime invariant check. We apply our CI framework to eleven RVs, including quadrotor, hexarotor, and ground rover, and show that the invariant check can detect three common types of physical attacks -including sensor attack, actuation signal attack, and parameter attack -with very low runtime overhead.
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Lineage
- RVFuzzer: Finding Input Validation Bugs in Robotic Vehicles through Control-Guided Testing cites Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View Switching
- Active fuzzing for testing and securing cyber-physical systems cites Learning from Mutants: Using Code Mutation to Learn and Monitor Invariants of a Cyber-Physical System
- Control Parameters Considered Harmful: Detecting Range Specification Bugs in Drone Configuration Modules via Learning-Guided Search cites RVFuzzer: Finding Input Validation Bugs in Robotic Vehicles through Control-Guided Testing
- Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View Switching cites Protecting Bare-Metal Embedded Systems with Privilege Overlays
Cited by top-tier papers28
- RVFuzzer: Finding Input Validation Bugs in Robotic Vehicles through Control-Guided TestingTaegyu Kim, Chung Hwan Kim, Junghwan Rhee, Fan Fei et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 92 citations
- SoK: Security and Privacy in the Age of Commercial DronesBen Nassi, Ron Bitton, Ryusuke Masuoka, Asaf Shabtai et al.S&P 2021 · 89 citations
- Stars Can Tell: A Robust Method to Defend against GPS Spoofing Attacks using Off-the-shelf ChipsetShinan Liu, Xiang Cheng, Hanchao Yang, Yuanchao Shu et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 29 citations
- Control Parameters Considered Harmful: Detecting Range Specification Bugs in Drone Configuration Modules via Learning-Guided SearchRuidong Han, Chao Yang, Siqi Ma, Jianfeng Ma et al.ICSE 2022 · 27 citations
- Active fuzzing for testing and securing cyber-physical systemsYuqi Chen, Bohan Xuan, Christopher M. Poskitt, Jun Sun et al.ISSTA 2020 · 25 citations
Builds on3
- Learning from Mutants: Using Code Mutation to Learn and Monitor Invariants of a Cyber-Physical SystemYuqi Chen, Christopher M. Poskitt, Jun SunS&P 2018 · 135 citations
- Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View SwitchingChung Hwan Kim, Taegyu Kim, Hongjun Choi, Zhongshu Gu et al.NDSS 2018 · 127 citations
- Protecting Bare-Metal Embedded Systems with Privilege OverlaysAbraham A. Clements, Naif Saleh Almakhdhub, Khaled Saab, Prashast Srivastava et al.S&P 2017 · 122 citations
Related papers
- Cyber-Physical Inconsistency Vulnerability Identification for Safety Checks in Robotic VehiclesHongjun Choi, Sayali Kate, Yousra Aafer, Xiangyu Zhang et al.CCS 2020 · 22 citations
- SAVIOR: Securing Autonomous Vehicles with Robust Physical InvariantsRaul Quinonez, Jairo Giraldo, Luis E. Salazar, Erick Bauman et al.USENIX Security 2020
- A Systematic Study of Physical Sensor Attack HardnessHyungsub Kim, Rwitam Bandyopadhyay, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Z. Berkay Celik et al.S&P 2024 · 27 citations
- IMUFuzzer: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial VehiclesSudharssan Mohan, Kyeongseok Yang, Zelun Kong, Yonghwi Kwon et al.ASE 2025
- PatchVerif: Discovering Faulty Patches in Robotic VehiclesHyungsub Kim, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Z. Berkay Celik, Antonio Bianchi et al.USENIX Security 2023
