A Systematic Study of Physical Sensor Attack Hardness
Hyungsub Kim, Rwitam Bandyopadhyay, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Z. Berkay Celik, Antonio Bianchi, Yongdae Kim, Dongyan Xu
Abstract
Physical sensor attacks against robotic vehicles (RV) have become a serious concern due to their prevalence and potential physical threat. However, RV software developers often do not deploy appropriate countermeasures. This hesitance stems from their belief that attackers face substantial challenges when conducting sensor attacks, e.g., nullifying sensor redundancy in hardware and circumventing sensor filters in software. Yet, we discover that attackers can overcome the challenges by fulfilling specific prerequisites and finely tuning attack parameters. The misconceptions that the developers have arisen from a lack of study regarding the level of difficulty attackers face in successfully achieving their attack goals, which we call "attack hardness".In this paper, we examine the hardness of 12 well-known sensor attacks. We first identify the prerequisites required to conduct the attacks successfully. We then quantify the hardness of each attack as how frequent the prerequisites enabling a specific attack are in the real world. To automate this analysis, we introduce RVPROBER, an attack prerequisite analysis framework. RVPROBER discovered that the 12 sensor attacks require, on average, 4.4 prerequisites, highlighting that previous literature has often missed important details required to perform these attacks. By satisfying the identified prerequisites and tuning attack parameters, we increased the number of successful attacks from 6 to 11. Moreover, our analysis showed that an average of 57.08% of actual RV users are vulnerable to sensor attacks. Finally, starting from the identified prerequisites, we analyzed the reasons behind the success of each attack and found previously-unknown root causes, such as design flaws in the RV software’s fail-safe logic.
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- IMUFuzzer: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial Vehicles cites Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
- IMUFuzzer: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial Vehicles cites SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security
- IMUFuzzer: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial Vehicles cites SoK: Security and Privacy in the Age of Commercial Drones
- Stars Can Tell: A Robust Method to Defend against GPS Spoofing Attacks using Off-the-shelf Chipset cites All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation Systems
- ADGFUZZ: Assignment Dependency-Guided Fuzzing for Robotic Vehicles cites All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation Systems
- SpecGuard: Specification Aware Recovery for Robotic Autonomous Vehicles from Physical Attacks cites Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
- SpecGuard: Specification Aware Recovery for Robotic Autonomous Vehicles from Physical Attacks cites SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security
- SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security cites Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
- SoK: Understanding the Fundamentals and Implications of Sensor Out-of-band Vulnerabilities cites Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
- SoK: Understanding the Fundamentals and Implications of Sensor Out-of-band Vulnerabilities cites SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security
Cited by top-tier papers8
- SpecGuard: Specification Aware Recovery for Robotic Autonomous Vehicles from Physical AttacksPritam Dash, Ethan Chan, Karthik PattabiramanCCS 2024 · 8 citations
- SoK: Understanding the Fundamentals and Implications of Sensor Out-of-band VulnerabilitiesShilin Xiao, Wenjun Zhu, Yan Jiang, Kai Wang et al.NDSS 2026 · 3 citations
- ADGFUZZ: Assignment Dependency-Guided Fuzzing for Robotic VehiclesYuncheng Wang, Yaowen Zheng, Puzhuo Liu, Dongliang Fang et al.NDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- Discovering Blind-Trust Vulnerabilities in PLC Binaries via State Machine RecoveryFangzhou Dong, Arvind S. Raj, Efrén López-Morales, Siyu Liu et al.NDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- IMUFuzzer: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial VehiclesSudharssan Mohan, Kyeongseok Yang, Zelun Kong, Yonghwi Kwon et al.ASE 2025
Builds on10
- All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation SystemsKexiong Curtis Zeng, Shinan Liu, Yuanchao Shu, Dong Wang et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 174 citations
- Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial SensorsYazhou Tu, Zhiqiang Lin, Insup Lee, Xiali HeiUSENIX Security 2018 · 132 citations
- SoK: Security and Privacy in the Age of Commercial DronesBen Nassi, Ron Bitton, Ryusuke Masuoka, Asaf Shabtai et al.S&P 2021 · 89 citations
- SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor SecurityChen Yan, Hocheol Shin, Connor Bolton, Wenyuan Xu et al.S&P 2020 · 86 citations
- Stars Can Tell: A Robust Method to Defend against GPS Spoofing Attacks using Off-the-shelf ChipsetShinan Liu, Xiang Cheng, Hanchao Yang, Yuanchao Shu et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 29 citations
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