Online Bidding Algorithms for Return-on-Spend Constrained Advertisers✱
Zhe Feng, Swati Padmanabhan, Di Wang
Abstract
Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billiondollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient "auto-bidding" algorithms that determine the bids for incoming queries to maximize advertisers' targets subject to their specified constraints. This work explores efficient online algorithms for a single value-maximizing advertiser under an increasingly popular constraint: Return-on-Spend (RoS). We quantify efficiency in terms of regret relative to the optimal algorithm, which knows all queries a priori. We contribute a simple online algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret in expectation while always respecting the specified RoS constraint when the input sequence of queries are i.i.d. samples from some distribution. We also integrate our results with the previous work of Balseiro, Lu, and Mirrokni [BLM20] to achieve near-optimal regret while respecting both RoS and fixed budget constraints. Our algorithm follows the primal-dual framework and uses online mirror descent (OMD) for the dual updates. However, we need to use a non-canonical setup of OMD, and therefore the classic low-regret guarantee of OMD, which is for the adversarial setting in online learning, no longer holds. Nonetheless, in our case and more generally where low-regret dynamics are applied in algorithm design, the gradients encountered by OMD can be far from adversarial but influenced by our algorithmic choices. We exploit this key insight to show our OMD setup achieves low regret in the realm of our algorithm. * Author names are listed in alphabetical order. † Work done as a student researcher in the Market Algorithms team at Google Research.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext fdfcc12c-dfc1-41a1-9cfa-ef35cc8e6749Cited by top-tier papers20
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