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Individual Welfare Guarantees in the Autobidding World with Machine-learned Advice

Yuan Deng, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, Vahab Mirrokni

Abstract

Online advertising channels commonly focus on maximizing total advertiser welfare to enhance channel health, and previous literature has studied augmenting ad auctions with machine learning predictions on advertiser values (also known asmachine-learned advice ) to improve total welfare. Yet, such improvements could come at the cost of individual bidders' welfare and do not shed light on how particular advertiser bidding strategies impact welfare. Motivated by this, we present an analysis on an individual bidder's welfare loss in the autobidding world for auctions with and without machine-learned advice, and also uncover how advertiser strategies relate to such losses. In particular, we demonstrate how ad platforms can utilize ML advice to improve welfare guarantee on the aggregate and individual bidder level by setting ML advice as personalized reserve prices when the platform consists ofautobidders who maximize value while respecting a return on ad spend (ROAS) constraint. Under parallel VCG auctions with such ML advice-based reserves, we present a worst-case welfare lower-bound guarantee for an individual autobidder, and show that the lower-bound guarantee is positively correlated with ML advice quality as well as the scale of bids induced by the autobidder's bidding strategies. Further, we show that no truthful, and possibly randomized mechanism with anonymous allocations can achieve universally better individual welfare guarantees than VCG, in the presence of personalized reserves based on ML-advice of equal quality. Moreover, we extend our individual welfare guarantee results to generalized first price (GFP) and generalized second price (GSP) auctions. Finally, we present numerical studies using semi-synthetic data derived from ad auction logs of a search ad platform to showcase improvements in individual welfare when setting personalized reserve prices with ML-advice.

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Lineage

  • Optimal Contest beyond Convexity cites Interpolating Item and User Fairness in Multi-Sided Recommendations
  • Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCG cites Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
  • Learning Safe Strategies for Value Maximizing Buyers in Uniform Price Auctions cites Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
  • Learning Safe Strategies for Value Maximizing Buyers in Uniform Price Auctions cites Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
  • Online Bidding under RoS Constraints without Knowing the Value cites Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Cited by top-tier papers5

  1. Interpolating Item and User Fairness in Multi-Sided RecommendationsQinyi Chen, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, Negin Golrezaei, Djallel BouneffoufNeurIPS 2024 · 8 citations
  2. Online Bidding under RoS Constraints without Knowing the ValueSushant Vijayan, Zhe Feng, Swati Padmanabhan, Karthikeyan Shanmugam et al.WWW 2025 · 4 citations
  3. Learning Personalized Ad Impact via Contextual Reinforcement Learning under Delayed RewardsYuwei Cheng, Zifeng Zhao, Haifeng XuNeurIPS 2025
  4. Optimal Contest beyond ConvexityNegin Golrezaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Suho ShinSTOC 2026
  5. Learning Safe Strategies for Value Maximizing Buyers in Uniform Price AuctionsNegin Golrezaei, Sourav SahooICML 2025

Builds on9

  1. CoinDICE: Off-Policy Confidence Interval EstimationBo Dai, Ofir Nachum, Yinlam Chow, Lihong Li et al.NeurIPS 2020 · 96 citations
  2. Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding WorldSantiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni et al.NeurIPS 2021 · 95 citations
  3. Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding WorldYuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song ZuoWWW 2021 · 87 citations
  4. Online Algorithms for Multi-shop Ski Rental with Machine Learned AdviceShufan Wang, Jian Li, Shiqiang WangNeurIPS 2020 · 60 citations
  5. Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCGAranyak MehtaWWW 2022 · 41 citations

Related papers

  1. No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI ConstraintsGagan Aggarwal, Giannis Fikioris, Mingfei ZhaoWWW 2025 · 13 citations
  2. Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding WorldYuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang et al.NeurIPS 2024 · 1 citation
  3. Model Monotonicity in Autobidding Auctions: When Do Better Predictions Lead to Better Outcomes?Ashwinkumar BadanidiyuruICML 2026
  4. No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price AuctionsYilin Li, Yuan Deng, Wei Tang, Hanrui ZhangNeurIPS 2025 · 4 citations
  5. Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget ConstraintsChristopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan ZhuWWW 2024 · 10 citations
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