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Achilles: A Formal Framework of Leaking Secrets from Signature Schemes via Rowhammer

Junkai Liang, Zhi Zhang, Xin Zhang, Qingni Shen, Yansong Gao, Xingliang Yuan, Haiyang Xue, Pengfei Wu, Zhonghai Wu

Abstract

Signature schemes are a fundamental component of cybersecurity infrastructure. While they are designed to be mathematically secure against cryptographic attacks, they are vulnerable to Rowhammer fault-injection attacks. Since all existing attacks are ad-hoc in that they target individual parameters of specific signature schemes, it remains unclear about the impact of Rowhammer on signature schemes as a whole. In this paper, we present Achilles, a formal framework that aids in leaking secrets in various real-world signature schemes via Rowhammer. Particularly, Achilles can be used to find potentially more vulnerable parameters in schemes that have been studied before and also new schemes that are potentially vulnerable. Achilles mainly describes a formal procedure where Rowhammer faults are induced to key parameters of a generalized signature scheme, called G-sign, and a post-Rowhammer analysis is then performed for secret recovery on it. To illustrate the viability of Achilles, we have evaluated six signature schemes (with five CVEs assigned to track their respective Rowhammer vulnerability), covering traditional and post-quantum signatures with different mathematical problems. Based on the analysis with Achilles, all six schemes are proved to be vulnerable, and two new vulnerable parameters are identified for EdDSA. Further, we demonstrate a successful Rowhammer attack against 3 of these schemes, using recent cryptographic libraries including wolfssl, relic, and liboqs.

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Lineage

  • Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms cites DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
  • Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms cites Flip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software Stack
  • Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses cites DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
  • Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses cites Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms
  • Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses cites Flip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software Stack
  • TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row Refresh cites DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
  • TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row Refresh cites Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms
  • TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row Refresh cites Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses
  • TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row Refresh cites Flip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software Stack
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Builds on23

  1. DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU AttacksPeter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 500 citations
  2. Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile PlatformsVictor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss et al.CCS 2016 · 381 citations
  3. Flip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software StackKaveh Razavi, Ben Gras, Erik Bosman, Bart Preneel et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 306 citations
  4. Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2018 · 288 citations
  5. TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row RefreshPietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen et al.S&P 2020 · 274 citations

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