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USENIX Security2016Top-tier venue

Flip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software Stack

Kaveh Razavi, Ben Gras, Erik Bosman, Bart Preneel, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert Bos

Abstract

We introduce Flip Feng Shui (FFS), a new exploitation vector which allows an attacker to induce bit flips over arbitrary physical memory in a fully controlled way. FFS relies on hardware bugs to induce bit flips over memory and on the ability to surgically control the physical memory layout to corrupt attacker-targeted data anywhere in the software stack. We show FFS is possible today with very few constraints on the target data, by implementing an instance using the Rowhammer bug and memory deduplication (an OS feature widely deployed in production). Memory deduplication allows an attacker to reverse-map any physical page into a virtual page she owns as long as the page's contents are known. Rowhammer, in turn, allows an attacker to flip bits in controlled (initially unknown) locations in the target page. We show FFS is extremely powerful: a malicious VM in a practical cloud setting can gain unauthorized access to a co-hosted victim VM running OpenSSH. Using FFS, we exemplify end-to-end attacks breaking OpenSSH public-key authentication, and forging GPG signatures from trusted keys, thereby compromising the Ubuntu/Debian update mechanism. We conclude by discussing mitigations and future directions for FFS attacks.

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  • Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX cites RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load
  • Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX cites Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms
  • Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX cites Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses
  • RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load cites Dedup Est Machina: Memory Deduplication as an Advanced Exploitation Vector
  • RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load cites Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms
  • Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms cites Dedup Est Machina: Memory Deduplication as an Advanced Exploitation Vector
  • Bit-Flip Attack: Crushing Neural Network With Progressive Bit Search cites Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses
  • Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses cites Dedup Est Machina: Memory Deduplication as an Advanced Exploitation Vector
  • Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses cites Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Cited by top-tier papers64

  1. RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data LoadStephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Österlund, Pietro Frigo et al.S&P 2019 · 408 citations
  2. Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile PlatformsVictor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss et al.CCS 2016 · 381 citations
  3. Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGXKit Murdock, David F. Oswald, Flavio D. Garcia, Jo Van Bulck et al.S&P 2020 · 369 citations
  4. Bit-Flip Attack: Crushing Neural Network With Progressive Bit SearchAdnan Siraj Rakin, Zhezhi He, Deliang FanICCV 2019 · 309 citations
  5. Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2018 · 288 citations

Builds on1

  1. Dedup Est Machina: Memory Deduplication as an Advanced Exploitation VectorErik Bosman, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaS&P 2016 · 252 citations

Related papers

  1. RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing ThemAndrew Kwong, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Yuval YaromS&P 2020 · 239 citations
  2. Go Go Gadget Hammer: Flipping Nested Pointers for Arbitrary Data LeakageYoussef Tobah, Andrew Kwong, Ingab Kang, Daniel Genkin et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 11 citations
  3. One Bit Flips, One Cloud Flops: Cross-VM Row Hammer Attacks and Privilege EscalationYuan Xiao, Xiaokuan Zhang, Yinqian Zhang, Radu TeodorescuUSENIX Security 2016 · 272 citations
  4. GeForge: Hammering GDDR Memory to Forge GPU Page Tables for Fun and ProfitJunpeng Wan, Yanan Guo, Zhi Zhang, Zhuo Li et al.S&P 2026 · 4 citations
  5. Copy-on-Flip: Hardening ECC Memory Against Rowhammer AttacksAndrea Di Dio, Koen Koning, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaNDSS 2023
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