Lune

CCS2022Top-tier venue

Physical Hijacking Attacks against Object Trackers

Raymond Muller, Yanmao Man, Z. Berkay Celik, Ming Li, Ryan M. Gerdes

2022Year
12Citations
15Top-tier citations

Abstract

Modern autonomous systems rely on both object detection and object tracking in their visual perception pipelines. Although many recent works have attacked the object detection component of autonomous vehicles, these attacks do not work on full pipelines that integrate object tracking to enhance the object detector's accuracy. Meanwhile, existing attacks against object tracking either lack real-world applicability or do not work against a powerful class of object trackers, Siamese trackers. In this paper, we present AttrackZone, a new physically-realizable tracker hijacking attack against Siamese trackers that systematically determines valid regions in an environment that can be used for physical perturbations. AttrackZone exploits the heatmap generation process of Siamese Region Proposal Networks in order to take control of an object's bounding box, resulting in physical consequences including vehicle collisions and masked intrusion of pedestrians into unauthorized areas. Evaluations in both the digital and physical domain show that AttrackZone achieves its attack goals 92% of the time, requiring only 0.3-3 seconds on average. CCS CONCEPTS • Computing methodologies → Machine learning algorithms; • Security and privacy → Systems security.

Ask about this paper

Your agent reads all of it.

Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.

Questions to start from

Your agent calls

Luneget_paper_fulltext

Ask in Lune

Free to start. No credit card required.

lune papers fulltext 338f4923-69d9-41cc-a3d1-737a6ec88004

Cited by top-tier papers15

Ask how each one uses it

Builds on13

Related papers

Dusk over the sea between two cliffs drawn in fine vertical lines