Post-Quantum TLS Without Handshake Signatures
Peter Schwabe, Douglas Stebila, Thom Wiggers
Abstract
We present KEMTLS, an alternative to the TLS 1.3 handshake that uses key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) instead of signatures for server authentication. Among existing post-quantum candidates, signature schemes generally have larger public key/signature sizes compared to the public key/ciphertext sizes of KEMs: by using an IND-CCA-secure KEM for server authentication in post-quantum TLS, we obtain multiple benefits. A size-optimized post-quantum instantiation of KEMTLS requires less than half the bandwidth of a size-optimized post-quantum instantiation of TLS 1.3. In a speed-optimized instantiation, KEMTLS reduces the amount of server CPU cycles by almost 90% compared to TLS 1.3, while at the same time reducing communication size, reducing the time until the client can start sending encrypted application data, and eliminating code for signatures from the server's trusted code base.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 2d43ca3b-17d7-47da-8b15-7773216942beCited by top-tier papers18
- A Logic and an Interactive Prover for the Computational Post-Quantum Security of ProtocolsCas Cremers, Caroline Fontaine, Charlie JacommeS&P 2022 · 19 citations
- When Messages Are Keys: Is HMAC a Dual-PRF?Matilda Backendal, Mihir Bellare, Felix Günther, Matteo ScarlataCRYPTO 2023 · 14 citations
- K-Waay: Fast and Deniable Post-Quantum X3DH without Ring SignaturesDaniel Collins, Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, Nicolas Rolin et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 12 citations
- Keeping Up with the KEMs: Stronger Security Notions for KEMs and Automated Analysis of KEM-based ProtocolsCas Cremers, Alexander Dax, Niklas MedingerCCS 2024 · 11 citations
- Proof-of-Possession for KEM Certificates using Verifiable GenerationTim Güneysu, Philip W. Hodges, Georg Land, Mike Ounsworth et al.CCS 2022 · 7 citations
Builds on8
- Post-quantum Key Exchange - A New HopeErdem Alkim, Léo Ducas, Thomas Pöppelmann, Peter SchwabeUSENIX Security 2016 · 972 citations
- WireGuard: Next Generation Kernel Network TunnelJason A. DonenfeldNDSS 2017 · 259 citations
- He Gives C-Sieves on the CSIDHChris PeikertEUROCRYPT 2020 · 120 citations
- Quantum Security Analysis of CSIDHXavier Bonnetain, André SchrottenloherEUROCRYPT 2020 · 103 citations
- "Make Sure DSA Signing Exponentiations Really are Constant-Time"Cesar Pereida García, Billy Bob Brumley, Yuval YaromCCS 2016 · 93 citations
Related papers
- Post-quantum TLS 1.3 Handshake from CPA-Secure KEMs with Tighter ReductionsJinrong Chen, Biming Zhou, Rongmao Chen, Haodong Jiang et al.EUROCRYPT 2026
- Looma: A Low-Latency PQTLS Authentication Architecture for Cloud ApplicationsXinshu Ma, Michio HondaNDSS 2026
- Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS 1.3: A Performance StudyDimitrios Sikeridis, Panos Kampanakis, Michael DevetsikiotisNDSS 2020
- On IND-qCCA Security in the ROM and Its Applications - CPA Security Is Sufficient for TLS 1.3Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan, Serge VaudenayEUROCRYPT 2022 · 18 citations
- Post-quantum WireGuardAndreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber et al.S&P 2021 · 73 citations
