Proof-of-Possession for KEM Certificates using Verifiable Generation
Tim Güneysu, Philip W. Hodges, Georg Land, Mike Ounsworth, Douglas Stebila, Greg Zaverucha
Abstract
Certificate authorities in public key infrastructures typically require entities to prove possession of the secret key corresponding to the public key they want certified. While this is straightforward for digital signature schemes, the most efficient solution for public key encryption and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) requires an interactive challenge-response protocol, requiring a departure from current issuance processes. In this work we investigate how to non-interactively prove possession of a KEM secret key, specifically for lattice-based KEMs, motivated by the recently proposed KEMTLS protocol which replaces signature-based authentication in TLS 1.3 with KEM-based authentication. Although there are various zero-knowledge (ZK) techniques that can be used to prove possession of a lattice key, they yield large proofs or are inefficient to generate. We propose a technique called verifiable generation, in which a proof of possession is generated at the same time as the key itself is generated. Our technique is inspired by the Picnic signature scheme and uses the multi-party-computation-in-the-head (MPCitH) paradigm; this similarity to a signature scheme allows us to bind attribute data to the proof of possession, as required by certificate issuance protocols. We show how to instantiate this approach for two lattice-based KEMs in Round 3 of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project, Kyber and FrodoKEM, and achieve reasonable proof sizes and performance. Our proofs of possession are faster and an order of magnitude smaller than the previous best MPCitH technique for knowledge of a lattice key, and in size-optimized cases can be comparable to even state-of-the-art direct lattice-based ZK proofs for Kyber. Our approach relies on a new result showing the uniqueness of Kyber and FrodoKEM secret keys, even if the requirement that all secret key components are small is partially relaxed, which may be of independent interest for improving efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs for other lattice-based statements.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 352b9a4c-bfb6-45da-8a8b-1ac5adf24c00Builds on14
- Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and MoreBenedikt Bünz, Jonathan Bootle, Dan Boneh, Andrew Poelstra et al.S&P 2018 · 1,285 citations
- Frodo: Take off the Ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWEJoppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, Léo Ducas, Ilya Mironov et al.CCS 2016 · 431 citations
- Ligero: Lightweight Sublinear Arguments Without a Trusted SetupScott Ames, Carmit Hazay, Yuval Ishai, Muthuramakrishnan VenkitasubramaniamCCS 2017 · 338 citations
- Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key PrimitivesMelissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi et al.CCS 2017 · 316 citations
- ZKBoo: Faster Zero-Knowledge for Boolean CircuitsIrene Giacomelli, Jesper Madsen, Claudio OrlandiUSENIX Security 2016 · 287 citations
Related papers
- MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based CryptographyWeihao Bai, Long Chen, Qianwen Gao, Zhenfeng ZhangS&P 2024 · 2 citations
- Formally Verifying Kyber - Episode V: Machine-Checked IND-CCA Security and Correctness of ML-KEM in EasyCryptJosé Bacelar Almeida, Santiago Arranz-Olmos, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe et al.CRYPTO 2024 · 16 citations
- Post-Quantum TLS Without Handshake SignaturesPeter Schwabe, Douglas Stebila, Thom WiggersCCS 2020 · 162 citations
- Faster Lattice-Based KEMs via a Generic Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform Using Prefix HashingJulien Duman, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Eike Kiltz, Vadim Lyubashevsky et al.CCS 2021 · 1 citation
- When Frodo Flips: End-to-End Key Recovery on FrodoKEM via RowhammerMichael Fahr, Hunter Kippen, Andrew Kwong, Thinh Dang et al.CCS 2022 · 34 citations
