ISA-Grid: Architecture of Fine-grained Privilege Control for Instructions and Registers
Shulin Fan, Zhichao Hua, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen, Binyu Zang
Abstract
Isolation is a critical mechanism for enhancing the security of computer systems. By controlling the access privileges of software and hardware resources, isolation mechanisms can decouple software into multiple isolated components and enforce the principle of least privilege. While existing isolation systems primarily focus on memory isolation, they overlook the isolation of instruction and register resources, which we refer to as ISA (Instruction Set Architecture) resources. However, previous works have shown that exploiting ISA resources can lead to serious security problems, such as breaking the system's memory isolation property by abusing x86's CR3 register. Furthermore, existing hardware only provides privilege-level-based access control for ISA resources, which is too coarse-grained for software decoupling. For example, ARM Cortex A53 has several hundred system instructions/registers, but only four exception levels (EL0 to EL3) are provided. Additionally, more than 100 instructions/registers for system control are available in only EL1 (the kernel mode). To address this problem, this paper proposes ISA-Grid, an architecture of fine-grained privilege control for instructions and registers. ISA-Grid is a hardware extension that enables the creation of multiple ISA domains, with each domain having different privileges to access instructions and registers. The ISA domain can provide bit-level fine-grained privilege control for registers. We implemented prototypes of ISA-Grid based on two different CPU cores: 1) a RISC-V CPU core on an FPGA board and 2) an x86 CPU core on a simulator. We applied ISA-Grid to different cases, including Linux kernel decomposition and enhancing existing security systems, to demonstrate how ISA-Grid can isolate ISA resources and mitigate attacks based on abusing them. The performance evaluation results on both x86 and RISC-V platforms with real-world applications showed that ISA-Grid has negligible runtime overhead (less than 1%).
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Cited by top-tier papers4
- Towards Practical Interrupt Side-Channel Attacks on macOS for Apple SiliconXin Zhang, Chang Liu, Jiajun Zou, Yi Yang et al.ISCA 2026 · 1 citation
- LatticeBox: A Hardware-Software Co-Designed Framework for Scalable and Low-Latency CompartmentalizationZhanpeng Liu, Chenyang Li, Wende Tan, Yuan Li et al.NDSS 2026 · 1 citation
- Interstellar: Fully Partitioned and Efficient Security Monitoring Hardware Near a Processor Core for Protecting Systems against Attacks on Privileged SoftwareYongho Song, Byeongsu Woo, Youngkwang Han, Brent ByungHoon KangCCS 2024 · 1 citation
- BULKHEAD: Secure, Scalable, and Efficient Kernel Compartmentalization with PKSYinggang Guo, Zicheng Wang, Weiheng Bai, Qingkai Zeng et al.NDSS 2025
Builds on26
- Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 1,175 citations
- Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGXKit Murdock, David F. Oswald, Flavio D. Garcia, Jo Van Bulck et al.S&P 2020 · 369 citations
- Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Nico Weichbrodt, Rüdiger Kapitza, Frank Piessens et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 316 citations
- ERIM: Secure, Efficient In-process Isolation with Protection Keys (MPK)Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Eslam Elnikety, Nuno O. Duarte, Michael Sammler et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 247 citations
- vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZoneZhichao Hua, Jinyu Gu, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen et al.USENIX Security 2017 · 136 citations
Related papers
- OPEC: operation-based security isolation for bare-metal embedded systemsXia Zhou, Jiaqi Li, Wenlong Zhang, Yajin Zhou et al.EuroSys 2022 · 18 citations
- HDFI: Hardware-Assisted Data-Flow IsolationChengyu Song, Hyungon Moon, Monjur Alam, Insu Yun et al.S&P 2016 · 146 citations
- PKU Pitfalls: Attacks on PKU-based Memory Isolation SystemsR. Joseph Connor, Tyler McDaniel, Jared M. Smith, Max SchuchardUSENIX Security 2020
- PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARMJiali Xu, Mengyao Xie, Chenggang Wu, Yinqian Zhang et al.CCS 2023 · 11 citations
- Limitations and Opportunities of Modern Hardware Isolation MechanismsXiangdong Chen, Zhaofeng Li, Tirth Jain, Vikram Narayanan et al.USENIX ATC 2024 · 7 citations
