USENIX Security2017Top-tier venue
vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone
Zhichao Hua, Jinyu Gu, Yubin Xia, Haibo Chen, Binyu Zang, Haibing Guan
Abstract
ARM TrustZone, a security extension that provides a secure world, a trusted execution environment (TEE), to run security-sensitive code, has been widely adopted in mobile platforms. With the increasing momentum of ARM64 being adopted in server markets like cloud, it is likely to see TrustZone being adopted as a key pillar for cloud security. Unfortunately, TrustZone is not designed to be virtualizable as there is only one TEE provided by the hardware, which prevents it from being securely shared by multiple virtual machines (VMs). This paper conducts a study on variable approaches to virtualizing TrustZone in virtualized environments and then presents vTZ, a solution that securely provides each guest VM with a virtualized guest TEE using existing hardware. vTZ leverages the idea of separating functionality from protection by maintaining a secure co-running VM to serve as a guest TEE, while using the hardware TrustZone to enforce strong isolation among guest TEEs and the untrusted hypervisor. Specifically, vTZ uses a tiny monitor running within the physical TrustZone that securely interposes and virtualizes memory mapping and world switching. vTZ further leverages a few pieces of protected, self-contained code running in a Constrained Isolated Execution Environment (CIEE) to provide secure virtualization and isolation among multiple guest TEEs. We have implemented vTZ on Xen 4.8 on both ARMv7 and ARMv8 development boards. Evaluation using two common TEE-kernels (secure kernel running in TEE) such as seL4 1 and OP-TEE shows that vTZ provides strong security with small performance overhead.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext eaa89eea-6ed7-491f-af65-e4fc90a7e2d8Cited by top-tier papers20
- SANCTUARY: ARMing TrustZone with User-space EnclavesFerdinand Brasser, David Gens, Patrick Jauernig, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi et al.NDSS 2019 · 191 citations
- CURE: A Security Architecture with CUstomizable and Resilient EnclavesRaad Bahmani, Ferdinand Brasser, Ghada Dessouky, Patrick Jauernig et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 150 citations
- Scalable Memory Protection in the PENGLAI EnclaveErhu Feng, Xu Lu, Dong Du, Bicheng Yang et al.OSDI 2021 · 126 citations
- Protecting Cloud Virtual Machines from Hypervisor and Host Operating System ExploitsShih-Wei Li, John S. Koh, Jason NiehUSENIX Security 2019 · 49 citations
- Understanding the Security of ARM Debugging FeaturesZhenyu Ning, Fengwei ZhangS&P 2019 · 41 citations
Builds on2
Related papers
- VirTEE: a full backward-compatible TEE with native live migration and secure I/OJianqiang Wang, Pouya Mahmoody, Ferdinand Brasser, Patrick Jauernig et al.DAC 2022 · 11 citations
- TwinVisor: Hardware-isolated Confidential Virtual Machines for ARMDingji Li, Zeyu Mi, Yubin Xia, Binyu Zang et al.SOSP 2021 · 39 citations
- FPGA-TrustZone: Security Extension of TrustZone to FPGA for SoC-FPGA Heterogeneous ArchitectureShupeng Wang, Xindong Fan, Xiao Xu, Shuchen Wang et al.DAC 2025 · 1 citation
- ZION: A Practical Confidential Virtual Machine Architecture on Commodity RISC-V ProcessorsJie Wang, Juan Wang, Yinqian ZhangDAC 2025 · 3 citations
- SHELTER: Extending Arm CCA with Isolation in User SpaceYiming Zhang, Yuxin Hu, Zhenyu Ning, Fengwei Zhang et al.USENIX Security 2023
