How Hard is Takeover in DPoS Blockchains? Understanding the Security of Coin-based Voting Governance
Chao Li, Balaji Palanisamy, Runhua Xu, Li Duan, Jiqiang Liu, Wei Wang
Abstract
Delegated-Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) blockchains, such as EOSIO, Steem and TRON, are governed by a committee of block producers elected via a coin-based voting system. We recently witnessed the first de facto blockchain takeover that happened between Steem and TRON. Within one hour of this incident, TRON founder took over the entire Steem committee, forcing the original Steem community to leave the blockchain that they maintained for years. This is a historical event in the evolution of blockchains and Web 3.0. Despite its significant disruptive impact, little is known about how vulnerable DPoS blockchains are in general to takeovers and the ways in which we can improve their resistance to takeovers. In this paper, we demonstrate that the resistance of a DPoS blockchain to takeovers is governed by both the theoretical design and the actual use of its underlying coin-based voting governance system. When voters actively cooperate to resist potential takeovers, our theoretical analysis reveals that the current active resistance of DPoS blockchains is far below the theoretical upper bound. However in practice, voter preferences could be significantly different. This paper presents the first large-scale empirical study of the passive takeover resistance of EOSIO, Steem and TRON. Our study identifies the diversity in voter preferences and characterizes the impact of this diversity on takeover resistance. Through both theoretical and empirical analyses, our study provides novel insights
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