TRIP: Coercion-resistant Registration for E-Voting with Verifiability and Usability in Votegral
Louis-Henri Merino, Simone Colombo, Rene Reyes, Alaleh Azhir, Shailesh Mishra, Pasindu Tennage, Mohammad Amin Raeisi, Haoqian Zhang, Jeff R. Allen, Bernhard Tellenbach, Vero Estrada-Galiñanes, Bryan Ford
摘要
Online voting is convenient and flexible, but amplifies the risks of voter coercion and vote buying. One promising mitigation strategy enables voters to give a coercer fake voting credentials, which silently cast votes that do not count. Current systems along these lines make problematic assumptions about credential issuance, however, such as strong trust in a registrar and/or in voter-controlled hardware, or expecting voters to interact with multiple registrars. Votegral is the first coercion-resistant voting architecture that leverages the physical security of in-person registration to address these credential-issuance challenges, amortizing the convenience costs of in-person registration by reusing credentials across successive elections. Votegral's registration component, TRIP, gives voters a kiosk in a privacy booth with which to print real and fake credentials on paper, eliminating dependence on trusted hardware in credential issuance. The voter learns and can verify in the privacy booth which credential is real, but real and fake credentials thereafter appear indistinguishable to others. Only voters actually under coercion, a hopefully-rare case, need to trust the kiosk. To achieve verifiability, each paper credential encodes an interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is sound in real credentials but unsound in fake credentials. Voters observe the difference in the order of printing steps, but need not understand the technical details. Experimental results with our prototype suggest that Votegral is practical and sufficiently scalable for real-world elections. User-visible latency of credential issuance in TRIP is at most 19.7 seconds even on resource-constrained kiosk hardware, making it suitable for registration at remote locations or on battery power. A companion usability study indicates that TRIP's usability is competitive with other e-voting systems including some lacking coercion resistance, and formal proofs support TRIP's combination of coercion-resistance and verifiability.
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它引用的顶会 Paper5
- Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?Matthew Bernhard, Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 44 次
- Forgetting of Passwords: Ecological Theory and DataXianyi Gao, Yulong Yang, Can Liu, Christos Mitropoulos 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 31 次
- E-Vote Your Conscience: Perceptions of Coercion and Vote Buying, and the Usability of Fake Credentials in Online VotingLouis-Henri Merino, Alaleh Azhir, Haoqian Zhang, Simone Colombo 等S&P 2024 · 被引用 5 次
- VoteAgain: A scalable coercion-resistant voting systemWouter Lueks, Iñigo Querejeta-Azurmendi, Carmela TroncosoUSENIX Security 2020
- POSEIDON: Privacy-Preserving Federated Neural Network LearningSinem Sav, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza, David Froelicher 等NDSS 2021
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