Thwarting Last-Minute Voter Coercion

Counter-strategies are key components of coercion-resistant voting schemes, allowing voters to submit votes that represent their own intentions in an environment controlled by a coercer. By deploying a counter-strategy a voter can prevent the coercer from learning if the voter followed the coercer’s instructions or not. Two effective counter-strategies have been proposed in the literature, one based on fake credentials and another on revoting. While fake-credential schemes assume that voters hide cryptographic keys away from the coercer, revoting schemes assume that voters can revote after being coerced.In this work, we present a new counter-strategy technique that enables flexible vote updating, that is, a revoting approach that provides protection against coercion even if the adversary is able to coerce a voter at the very last minute of the voting phase. We demonstrate that our technique is effective by implementing it in Loki, an Internet-based coercion-resistant voting scheme that allows revoting. We prove that Loki satisfies a game-based definition of coercion-resistance that accounts for flexible vote updating. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first technique that enables deniable coercion-resistant voting and that can evade last-minute voter coercion.