The Guardians of Name Street: Studying the Defensive Registration Practices of the Fortune 500
Boladji Vinny Adjibi, Athanasios Avgetidis, Manos Antonakakis, Michael D. Bailey, Fabian Monrose
摘要
Using orthographic, phonetic, and semantic models, we study the prevalence of defensive registrations related to a wide spectrum of transformations of the base domain names of Fortune 500 companies. As part of a large-scale evaluation, we explore several questions aimed at (a) understanding whether there are explainable factors (e.g., the size of the company's security team or its domain name's popularity rank) that correlate with a company's level of engagement regarding defensive registrations; (b) identifying the main actors in the defensive registration ecosystem that Fortune 500 companies rely upon; (c) uncovering the strategies used by these actors, and d) assessing the efficacy of those strategies from the perspective of queries emanating from a large Internet Service Provider (ISP). Overall, we identified 19,523 domain names defensively registered by 447 Fortune 500 companies. These companies engage in defensive registrations sparingly, with almost 200 companies having fewer than ten defensive registrations. By analyzing the registrations, we found many similarities between the types of domain names the companies registered. For instance, they all registered many TLD-squatting domain names. As it turns out, those similarities are due to the companies' reliance on online brand protection (OBP) service providers to protect their brands. Our analysis of the efficacy of the strategies of those OBPs showed that they register domain names that receive most of the potential squatting traffic. Using regression models, we learned from those strategies to provide recommendations for future defensive registrants. Our measurement also revealed many domain names that received high proportions of traffic over long periods of time and could be registered for only 15 USD. To prevent the abusive use of such domain names, we recommend that OBP providers proactively leverage passive DNS data to identify and preemptively register highly queried available domain names.
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脉络
- Hiding in Plain Sight: A Longitudinal Study of Combosquatting Abuse 引用了 All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS Records
- Repairing Trust in Domain Name Disputes Practices: Insights from a Quarter-Century's Worth of Squabbles 引用了 Hiding in Plain Sight: A Longitudinal Study of Combosquatting Abuse
引用它的顶会 Paper1
它引用的 Paper12
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- Targeted Online Password Guessing: An Underestimated ThreatDing Wang, Zijian Zhang, Ping Wang, Jeff Yan 等CCS 2016 · 385 次引用
- Hiding in Plain Sight: A Longitudinal Study of Combosquatting AbusePanagiotis Kintis, Najmeh Miramirkhani, Charles Lever, Yizheng Chen 等CCS 2017 · 166 次引用
- All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS RecordsDaiping Liu, Shuai Hao, Haining WangCCS 2016 · 91 次引用
- Measurement and Analysis of Private Key Sharing in the HTTPS EcosystemFrank Cangialosi, Taejoong Chung, David R. Choffnes, Dave Levin 等CCS 2016 · 89 次引用
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