Repairing Trust in Domain Name Disputes Practices: Insights from a Quarter-Century's Worth of Squabbles
Boladji Vinny Adjibi, Athanasios Avgetidis, Manos Antonakakis, Alberto Dainotti, Michael D. Bailey, Fabian Monrose
摘要
—The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) seeks to balance two competing goals: empowering trademark holders to swiftly address cybersquatting cases targeting their brands and protecting domain registrants from aggressive legal tactics by overreaching trademark holders. Since its inception, the UDRP has become the de facto dispute resolution mechanism for over two thousand domain extensions, a substantial increase from the original three. However, despite its successes, critics argue that the policy enables practices that undermine trust and fairness. Unfortunately, meaningful reform efforts have stalled due to the absence of large-scale structured data, limiting empirical evaluations and leaving foundational questions unanswered for more than two decades. To address this long-standing gap, we trained models to extract structured data from 90,153 UDRP dispute proceedings, enabling the most comprehensive empirical analysis of the policy to date. Our findings shed light on several issues, showing evidence of forum shopping in almost one-third of all the disputes, potential conflicts of interest in 43 cases, and delays (by many parties) that fall well outside the expected response times—all of which impact the perceived fairness and efficiency of UDRP. Beyond eroding trust, those issues create serious security challenges: 2,751 malicious domains remained under malicious actors’ con-trol for up to four months after a panel ordered their transfer. Overall, our findings underscore the need for policy reform to help restore trust and improve transparency in the Internet’s de facto standard for countering trademark infringement. Based on our discoveries, we recommend introducing greater automation, strengthening oversight, and enforcing clearer compliance rules to ensure that the UDRP remains a reliable tool for trademark-based name disputes—especially as the Internet continues to expand with new generic top-level domains and the digital environment becomes increasingly hostile to users.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
它引用的顶会 Paper4
- Hiding in Plain Sight: A Longitudinal Study of Combosquatting AbusePanagiotis Kintis, Najmeh Miramirkhani, Charles Lever, Yizheng Chen 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 166 次
- The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKIDoowon Kim, Bum Jun Kwon, Kristián Kozák, Christopher Gates 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 32 次
- The Imitation Game: Exploring Brand Impersonation Attacks on Social Media PlatformsBhupendra Acharya, Dario Lazzaro, Efrén López-Morales, Adam Oest 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 7 次
- The Guardians of Name Street: Studying the Defensive Registration Practices of the Fortune 500Boladji Vinny Adjibi, Athanasios Avgetidis, Manos Antonakakis, Michael D. Bailey 等NDSS 2025
相关 Paper
- Understanding the Implementation and Security Implications of Protective DNS ServicesMingxuan Liu, Yiming Zhang, Xiang Li, Chaoyi Lu 等NDSS 2024
- Domain-Z: 28 Registrations Later Measuring the Exploitation of Residual Trust in DomainsChaz Lever, Robert J. Walls, Yacin Nadji, David Dagon 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 76 次
- Exposing the Roots of DNS Abuse: A Data-Driven Analysis of Key Factors Behind Phishing Domain RegistrationsYevheniya Nosyk, Maciej Korczynski, Carlos Gañán, Sourena Maroofi 等CCS 2025 · 被引用 1 次
- Misty Registry: An Empirical Study of Flawed Domain Registry OperationMingming Zhang, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, Haixin Duan 等USENIX Security 2025
- You've Got Report: Measurement and Security Implications of DMARC ReportingMd. Ishtiaq Ashiq, Weitong Li, Tobias Fiebig, Taejoong ChungUSENIX Security 2023
