SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search
Benjamin Fuller, Mayank Varia, Arkady Yerukhimovich, Emily Shen, Ariel Hamlin, Vijay Gadepally, Richard Shay, John Darby Mitchell, Robert K. Cunningham
摘要
Protected database search systems cryptographically isolate the roles of reading from, writing to, and administering the database. This separation limits unnecessary administrator access and protects data in the case of system breaches. Since protected search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown rapidly; systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established companies. However, there is no best protected search system or set of techniques. Design of such systems is a balancing act between security, functionality, performance, and usability. This challenge is made more difficult by ongoing database specialization, as some users will want the functionality of SQL, NoSQL, or NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and the protected search community should be able to quickly provide functionality consistent with newly invented databases. At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly characterize the tradeoffs between different approaches. To address these challenges, we provide the following contributions: 1) An identification of the important primitive operations across database paradigms. We find there are a small number of base operations that can be used and combined to support a large number of database paradigms. 2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search systems in implementing these base operations. This evaluation describes the main approaches and tradeoffs for each base operation. Furthermore, it puts protected search in the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in functionality. 3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different base queries. 4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search system into a protected database, including an open-source performance evaluation platform and initial user opinions of protected search.
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引用它的顶会 Paper21
- Improved Reconstruction Attacks on Encrypted Data Using Range Query LeakageMarie-Sarah Lacharité, Brice Minaud, Kenneth G. PatersonS&P 2018 · 被引用 183 次
- Hiding the Access Pattern is Not Enough: Exploiting Search Pattern Leakage in Searchable EncryptionSimon Oya, Florian KerschbaumUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 152 次
- Learning to Reconstruct: Statistical Learning Theory and Encrypted Database AttacksPaul Grubbs, Marie-Sarah Lacharité, Brice Minaud, Kenneth G. PatersonS&P 2019 · 被引用 146 次
- ObliDB: Oblivious Query Processing for Secure DatabasesSaba Eskandarian, Matei ZahariaVLDB 2020 · 被引用 127 次
- The State of the Uniform: Attacks on Encrypted Databases Beyond the Uniform Query DistributionEvgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, Roberto TamassiaS&P 2020 · 被引用 104 次
它引用的顶会 Paper7
- All Your Queries Are Belong to Us: The Power of File-Injection Attacks on Searchable EncryptionYupeng Zhang, Jonathan Katz, Charalampos PapamanthouUSENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 512 次
- Generic Attacks on Secure Outsourced DatabasesGeorgios Kellaris, George Kollios, Kobbi Nissim, Adam O'NeillCCS 2016 · 被引用 327 次
- Leakage-Abuse Attacks against Order-Revealing EncryptionPaul Grubbs, Kevin Sekniqi, Vincent Bindschaedler, Muhammad Naveed 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 204 次
- The Shadow Nemesis: Inference Attacks on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently Searchable EncryptionDavid Pouliot, Charles V. WrightCCS 2016 · 被引用 132 次
- Breaking Web Applications Built On Top of Encrypted DataPaul Grubbs, Richard McPherson, Muhammad Naveed, Thomas Ristenpart 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 106 次
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