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CCS2016顶会

The Shadow Nemesis: Inference Attacks on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently Searchable Encryption

David Pouliot, Charles V. Wright

2016年份
132被引次数
31顶会引用

摘要

Encrypting Internet communications has been the subject of renewed focus in recent years. In order to add end-to-end encryption to legacy applications without losing the convenience of full-text search, ShadowCrypt and Mimesis Aegis use a new cryptographic technique called "efficiently deployable efficiently searchable encryption" (EDESE) that allows a standard full-text search system to perform searches on encrypted data. Compared to other recent techniques for searching on encrypted data, EDESE schemes leak a great deal of statistical information about the encrypted messages and the keywords they contain. Until now, the practical impact of this leakage has been difficult to quantify.

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