Beyond the Surface: Uncovering the Unprotected Components of Android Against Overlay Attack
Hao Zhou, Shuohan Wu, Chenxiong Qian, Xiapu Luo, Haipeng Cai, Chao Zhang
摘要
—Overlay is a notable user interface feature in the Android system, which allows an app to draw over other apps’ windows. While overlay enhances user experience and allows concurrent app interaction, it has been extensively abused for malicious purposes, such as "tapjacking", leading to so-called overlay attacks. In order to combat this threat, Google introduced a dedicated window flag SYSTEM_FLAG_HIDE_NON_SYSTEM_OVERLAY_WINDOWS to protect critical system apps’ windows against overlay attacks. Unfortunately, the adequacy of such protection in the Android system remains unstudied, with a noticeable absence of clear usage guidelines. To bridge the gap, in this paper, we conduct the first systematic study on the unprotected windows of system apps against overlay attacks. We propose a comprehensive guideline and then design and develop a new tool named OverlayChecker to identify the missing protections in Android system apps. To verify the uncovered issues, we also design and create Proof-of-Concept apps. After applying OverlayChecker to 8 commercial Android systems on 4 recently released Android versions, we totally discovered 49 vulnerable system apps’ windows. We reported our findings to the mobile vendors, including Google, Samsung, Vivo, Xiaomi, and Honor. At the time of writing, 15 of them have been confirmed. 5 CVEs have been assigned, and 3 of them are rated high severity. We also received bug bounty rewards from these mobile vendors.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper3
- Shadowed Realities: An Investigation of UI Attacks in WebXRChandrika Mukherjee, Reham Mohamed, Arjun Arunasalam, Habiba Farrukh 等USENIX Security 2025
- SoK: History Doesn't Repeat Itself, but Android Design-Level Vulnerabilities Rhyme in OpenHarmonyHongkai Chen, Yuqing Yang, Chao Wang, Arpit Nandi 等USENIX Security 2026
- Harness: Transparent and Lightweight Protection of Vehicle Control on Untrusted Android Automotive Operating SystemHaochen Gong, Siyu Hong, Shenyi Yang, Rui Chang 等USENIX Security 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper14
- IntelliDroid: A Targeted Input Generator for the Dynamic Analysis of Android MalwareMichelle Y. Wong, David LieNDSS 2016 · 被引用 253 次
- On Demystifying the Android Application Framework: Re-Visiting Android Permission Specification AnalysisMichael Backes, Sven Bugiel, Erik Derr, Patrick D. McDaniel 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 161 次
- Cloak and Dagger: From Two Permissions to Complete Control of the UI Feedback LoopYanick Fratantonio, Chenxiong Qian, Simon P. Chung, Wenke LeeS&P 2017 · 被引用 126 次
- Phishing Attacks on Modern AndroidSimone Aonzo, Alessio Merlo, Giulio Tavella, Yanick FratantonioCCS 2018 · 被引用 68 次
- WindowGuard: Systematic Protection of GUI Security in AndroidChuangang Ren, Peng Liu, Sencun ZhuNDSS 2017 · 被引用 45 次
相关 Paper
- TapTrap: Animation-Driven Tapjacking on AndroidPhilipp Beer, Marco Squarcina, Sebastian Roth, Martina LindorferUSENIX Security 2025
- ClickShield: Are You Hiding Something? Towards Eradicating Clickjacking on AndroidAndrea Possemato, Andrea Lanzi, Simon Pak Ho Chung, Wenke Lee 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 31 次
- Component Security Ten Years Later: An Empirical Study of Cross-Layer Threats in Real-World Mobile ApplicationsKeke Lian, Lei Zhang, Guangliang Yang, Shuo Mao 等FSE 2024 · 被引用 5 次
- Uncovering Intent based Leak of Sensitive Data in Android FrameworkHao Zhou, Xiapu Luo, Haoyu Wang, Haipeng CaiCCS 2022 · 被引用 9 次
- PHYjacking: Physical Input Hijacking for Zero-Permission Authorization Attacks on AndroidXianbo Wang, Shangcheng Shi, Yikang Chen, Wing Cheong LauNDSS 2022
