Lune

USENIX Security2026顶会

SoK: History Doesn't Repeat Itself, but Android Design-Level Vulnerabilities Rhyme in OpenHarmony

Hongkai Chen, Yuqing Yang, Chao Wang, Arpit Nandi, Moritz Schloegel, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang, Adam Doupé, Zhiqiang Lin, Yan Shoshitaishvili

出版方
2026年份

摘要

The dominant market share of Android across the world has led to significant scrutiny by security researchers. Over the years, many security issues were identified and remedied not only in its implementation but also in its design. Interestingly, academia has not further systematized these design flaws. This is an important gap, especially as many phone vendors have recently begun developing their own mobile operating systems (OSes). While they do not necessarily reuse the code of Android, they may share much of its design as they often use Android as a starting point. A prime example is Huawei's new OS, OpenHarmony, which has been deployed on over one billion devices, but its security has not been studied in academia. We posit that the Design-Level Vulnerabilities in Android can affect these emerging mobile OSes, leaving their users at risk.

In this paper, we systematically study Design-Level Vulnerabilities in Android and how they affect emerging mobile OSes. First, we review 116 publications on Android from industry and academia, and we extract 56 unique vulnerabilities reported in Android's design. For each, we identify a reusable auditing methodology to enable testing of emerging mobile OSes. In a second step, we apply our auditing methodologies to OpenHarmony and demonstrate that OpenHarmony is vulnerable to 24 of the vulnerabilities, including ones that compromise user privacy, enable stealthy privilege escalation, and undermine overall system reliability.

问问这篇 Paper

智能体会读完全文。

Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。

可以从这些问题问起

智能体调用

Luneget_paper_fulltext

在 Lune 里问

免费开始,无需绑卡

它引用的顶会 Paper64

相关 Paper

黄昏的海面,两侧是细线勾勒的悬崖