Call Me Back!: Attacks on System Server and System Apps in Android through Synchronous Callback
Kai Wang, Yuqing Zhang, Peng Liu
摘要
Android is the most commonly used mobile device operation system. The core of Android, the System Server (SS), is a multi-threaded process that provides most of the system services. Based on a new understanding of the security risks introduced by the callback mechanism in system services, we have discovered a general type of design flaw. A vulnerability detection tool has been designed and implemented based on static taint analysis.We applied the tool on all the 80 system services in the SS of Android 5.1.0. With its help, we have discovered six previously unknown vulnerabilities, which are further confirmed on Android 2.3.7-6.0.1. According to our analysis, about 97.3% of the entire 1.4 billion realworld Android devices are vulnerable. Our proof-of-concept attack proves that the vulnerabilities can enable a malicious app to freeze critical system functionalities or soft-reboot the system immediately. It is a neat type of denial-of-service attack. We also proved that the attacks can be conducted at mission critical moments to achieve meaningful goals, such as anti anti-virus, anti process-killer, hindering app updates or system patching. After being informed, Google confirmed our findings promptly. Several suggestions on how to use callbacks safely are also proposed to Google.
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