Groove: Flexible Metadata-Private Messaging
Ludovic Barman, Moshe Kol, David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich
摘要
Metadata-private messaging designs that scale to support millions of users are rigid: they limit users to a single device that is online all the time and transmits on short regular intervals, and require users to choose precisely when each of their buddies can message them. These requirements induce high network and energy costs for the clients, restricting users to communicate via one powerful device, like their desktop.
Groove is the first scalable metadata-private messaging system that gives users flexibility: it supports users with multiple devices, allows them to message buddies at any time, even when those buddies are offline, and conserves the user's device bandwidth and energy. Groove offers flexibility by introducing oblivious delegation, where users designate an untrusted service provider to participate in rigid mechanisms of metadata-private communication. It provides differential privacy guarantees on par with rigid systems like Stadium and Karaoke.
An evaluation of a Groove prototype on AWS with 100 servers, distributed across four data centers on two continents, demonstrates that it can achieve 32 s of latency for 1 million users with 50 buddies in their contact lists. Experiments with a client running on a Pixel 4 smartphone show that it uses about 100 MB/month of bandwidth and increases battery consumption by 50 mW (+16%) compared to an idle smartphone. These measurements show that Groove makes it realistic to hide messaging metadata on a mobile device.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper9
- Boomerang: Metadata-Private Messaging under Hardware TrustPeipei Jiang, Qian Wang, Jianhao Cheng, Cong Wang 等NSDI 2023 · 被引用 13 次
- Periscoping: Private Key Distribution for Large-Scale MixnetsShuhao Liu, Li Chen, Yuanzhong FuINFOCOM 2024 · 被引用 1 次
- Impact Tracing: Identifying the Culprit of Misinformation in Encrypted Messaging SystemsZhongming Wang, Tao Xiang, Xiaoguo Li, Biwen Chen 等NDSS 2025
- Powering Privacy: On the Energy Demand and Feasibility of Anonymity Networks on SmartphonesDaniel Hugenroth, Alastair R. BeresfordUSENIX Security 2023
- Sparta: Practical Anonymity with Long-Term Resistance to Traffic AnalysisKyle Fredrickson, Ioannis Demertzis, James P. Hughes, Darrell D. E. LongS&P 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper5
- PIR with Compressed Queries and Amortized Query ProcessingSebastian Angel, Hao Chen, Kim Laine, Srinath T. V. SettyS&P 2018 · 被引用 353 次
- The Loopix Anonymity SystemAnia M. Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 214 次
- Express: Lowering the Cost of Metadata-hiding Communication with Cryptographic PrivacySaba Eskandarian, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, Matei Zaharia, Dan BonehUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 98 次
- XRD: Scalable Messaging System with Cryptographic PrivacyAlbert Kwon, David Lu, Srinivas DevadasNSDI 2020 · 被引用 87 次
- Addra: Metadata-private voice communication over fully untrusted infrastructureIshtiyaque Ahmad, Yuntian Yang, Divyakant Agrawal, Amr El Abbadi 等OSDI 2021 · 被引用 79 次
相关 Paper
- Myco: Unlocking Polylogarithmic Accesses in Metadata-Private MessagingDarya Kaviani, Deevashwer Rathee, Bhargav Annem, Raluca Ada PopaS&P 2025
- Distributed PIR: Scaling Private Messaging via the Users' MachinesElkana Tovey, Jonathan Weiss, Yossi GiladCCS 2024 · 被引用 8 次
- MCMix: Anonymous Messaging via Secure Multiparty ComputationNikolaos Alexopoulos, Aggelos Kiayias, Riivo Talviste, Thomas ZachariasUSENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 85 次
- Metal: A Metadata-Hiding File-Sharing SystemWeikeng Chen, Raluca Ada PopaNDSS 2020
- Onion Franking: Abuse Reports for Mix-Based Private MessagingMatthew Gregoire, Margaret Pierce, Saba EskandarianNDSS 2025
