Impact Tracing: Identifying the Culprit of Misinformation in Encrypted Messaging Systems
Zhongming Wang, Tao Xiang, Xiaoguo Li, Biwen Chen, Guomin Yang, Chuan Ma, Robert H. Deng
摘要
—Encrypted messaging systems obstruct content moderation, although they provide end-to-end security. As a result, misinformation proliferates in these systems, thereby exacerbating online hate and harassment. The paradigm of “Reporting-then-Tracing” shows great potential in mitigating the spread of misinformation. For instance, message traceback (CCS’19) traces all the dissemination paths of a message, while source tracing (CCS’21) traces its originator. However, message traceback lacks privacy preservation for non-influential users (e.g., users who only receive the message once), while source tracing maintains privacy but only provides limited traceability. In this paper, we initiate the study of impact tracing . In-tuitively, impact tracing traces influential spreaders central to disseminating misinformation while providing privacy protection for non-influential users. We introduce noises to hide non-influential users and demonstrate that these noises do not hinder the identification of influential spreaders. Then, we formally prove our scheme’s security and show it achieves differential privacy protection for non-influential users. Additionally, we define three metrics to evaluate its traceability, correctness, and privacy using real-world datasets. The experimental results show that our scheme identifies the most influential spreaders with accuracy from 82% to 99% as the amount of noise varies. Meanwhile, our scheme requires only a 6-byte platform storage overhead for each message while maintaining a low messaging latency ( < 0.25ms).
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper11
- SoK: Hate, Harassment, and the Changing Landscape of Online AbuseKurt Thomas, Devdatta Akhawe, Michael D. Bailey, Dan Boneh 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 175 次
- Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency - Choose TwoDebajyoti Das, Sebastian Meiser, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Aniket KateS&P 2018 · 被引用 99 次
- Addra: Metadata-private voice communication over fully untrusted infrastructureIshtiyaque Ahmad, Yuntian Yang, Divyakant Agrawal, Amr El Abbadi 等OSDI 2021 · 被引用 79 次
- Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted MessagingNirvan Tyagi, Ian Miers, Thomas RistenpartCCS 2019 · 被引用 39 次
- End-to-End Secure Messaging with Traceability Only for Illegal ContentJames Bartusek, Sanjam Garg, Abhishek Jain, Guru-Vamsi PolicharlaEUROCRYPT 2023 · 被引用 20 次
相关 Paper
- Secure Complaint-Enabled Source-Tracking for Encrypted MessagingCharlotte Peale, Saba Eskandarian, Dan BonehCCS 2021 · 被引用 12 次
- Fighting Fake News in Encrypted Messaging with the Fuzzy Anonymous Complaint Tally System (FACTS)Linsheng Liu, Daniel S. Roche, Austin Theriault, Arkady YerukhimovichNDSS 2022
- Onion Franking: Abuse Reports for Mix-Based Private MessagingMatthew Gregoire, Margaret Pierce, Saba EskandarianNDSS 2025
- FedCTQ: A Federated-Based Framework for Accurate and Efficient Contact Tracing QueryZhihao Zeng, Ziquan Fang, Lu Chen, Yunjun Gao 等ICDE 2024 · 被引用 2 次
- Practical Traffic Analysis Attacks on Secure Messaging ApplicationsAlireza Bahramali, Amir Houmansadr, Ramin Soltani, Dennis Goeckel 等NDSS 2020
