End-to-End Secure Messaging with Traceability Only for Illegal Content
James Bartusek, Sanjam Garg, Abhishek Jain, Guru-Vamsi Policharla
摘要
As end-to-end encrypted messaging services become widely adopted, law enforcement agencies have increasingly expressed concern that such services interfere with their ability to maintain public safety. Indeed, there is a direct tension between preserving user privacy and enabling content moderation on these platforms. Recent research has begun to address this tension, proposing systems that purport to strike a balance between the privacy of ''honest'' users and traceability of ''malicious'' users. Unfortunately, these systems suffer from a lack of protection against malicious or coerced service providers.
In this work, we address the privacy vs. content moderation question through the lens of pre-constrained cryptography [Ananth et al., ITCS 2022]. We introduce the notion of set pre-constrained (SPC) group signatures that guarantees security against malicious key generators. SPC group signatures offer the ability to trace users in messaging systems who originate pre-defined illegal content (such as child sexual abuse material), while providing security against malicious service providers.
We construct concretely efficient protocols for SPC group signatures, and demonstrate the real-world feasibility of our approach via an implementation. The starting point for our solution is the recently introduced Apple PSI system, which we significantly modify to improve security and expand functionality.
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引用它的顶会 Paper5
- Fuzzy Private Set Intersection with Large HyperballsAron van Baarsen, Sihang PuEUROCRYPT 2024 · 被引用 18 次
- Breaking Widely Deployed Perceptual Hash Functions: Black-Box Collisions in Apple NeuralHash and Microsoft PhotoDNADiane Leblanc-Albarel, Bart PreneelUSENIX Security 2026
- Abuse Resistant Traceability with Minimal Trust for Encrypted Messaging SystemsZhongming Wang, Tao Xiang, Xiaoguo Li, Guomin Yang 等NDSS 2026
- Impact Tracing: Identifying the Culprit of Misinformation in Encrypted Messaging SystemsZhongming Wang, Tao Xiang, Xiaoguo Li, Biwen Chen 等NDSS 2025
- Ring of Gyges: Accountable Anonymous Broadcast via Secret-Shared ShuffleWentao Dong, Peipei Jiang, Huayi Duan, Cong Wang 等NDSS 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper8
- Identifying Harmful Media in End-to-End Encrypted Communication: Efficient Private Membership ComputationAnunay Kulshrestha, Jonathan R. MayerUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 50 次
- Compressing Proofs of k-Out-Of-n Partial KnowledgeThomas Attema, Ronald Cramer, Serge FehrCRYPTO 2021 · 被引用 42 次
- Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted MessagingNirvan Tyagi, Ian Miers, Thomas RistenpartCCS 2019 · 被引用 39 次
- Abuse Resistant Law Enforcement Access SystemsMatthew Green, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Gijs Van LaerEUROCRYPT 2021 · 被引用 17 次
- Secure Complaint-Enabled Source-Tracking for Encrypted MessagingCharlotte Peale, Saba Eskandarian, Dan BonehCCS 2021 · 被引用 12 次
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