Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor
Dong Huang, Qingwen Bu
摘要
Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2% to 65.41% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.
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引用它的顶会 Paper2
- WaveAttack: Asymmetric Frequency Obfuscation-based Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Neural NetworksJun Xia, Zhihao Yue, Yingbo Zhou, Zhiwei Ling 等NeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 17 次
- Backdoor Mitigation via Invertible Pruning MasksKealan Dunnett, Reza Arablouei, Volkan Dedeoglu, Dimity Miller 等NeurIPS 2025 · 被引用 3 次
它引用的顶会 Paper14
- Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural NetworksBolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 1,801 次
- Invisible Backdoor Attack with Sample-Specific TriggersYuezun Li, Yiming Li, Baoyuan Wu, Longkang Li 等ICCV 2021 · 被引用 639 次
- Neural Attention Distillation: Erasing Backdoor Triggers from Deep Neural NetworksYige Li, Xixiang Lyu, Nodens Koren, Lingjuan Lyu 等ICLR 2021 · 被引用 548 次
- ABS: Scanning Neural Networks for Back-doors by Artificial Brain StimulationYingqi Liu, Wen-Chuan Lee, Guanhong Tao, Shiqing Ma 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 531 次
- Anti-Backdoor Learning: Training Clean Models on Poisoned DataYige Li, Xixiang Lyu, Nodens Koren, Lingjuan Lyu 等NeurIPS 2021 · 被引用 503 次
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