ABS: Scanning Neural Networks for Back-doors by Artificial Brain Stimulation
Yingqi Liu, Wen-Chuan Lee, Guanhong Tao, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Xiangyu Zhang
摘要
This paper presents a technique to scan neural network based AI models to determine if they are trojaned. Pre-trained AI models may contain back-doors that are injected through training or by transforming inner neuron weights. These trojaned models operate normally when regular inputs are provided, and mis-classify to a specific output label when the input is stamped with some special pattern called trojan trigger. We develop a novel technique that analyzes inner neuron behaviors by determining how output activations change when we introduce different levels of stimulation to a neuron. The neurons that substantially elevate the activation of a particular output label regardless of the provided input is considered potentially compromised. Trojan trigger is then reverse-engineered through an optimization procedure using the stimulation analysis results, to confirm that a neuron is truly compromised. We evaluate our system ABS on 177 trojaned models that are trojaned with various attack methods that target both the input space and the feature space, and have various trojan trigger sizes and shapes, together with 144 benign models that are trained with different data and initial weight values. These models belong to 7 different model structures and 6 different datasets, including some complex ones such as ImageNet, VGG-Face and ResNet110. Our results show that ABS is highly effective, can achieve over 90% detection rate for most cases (and many 100%), when only one input sample is provided for each output label. It substantially out-performs the state-of-the-art technique Neural Cleanse that requires a lot of input samples and small trojan triggers to achieve good performance.
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引用它的顶会 Paper145
- Input-Aware Dynamic Backdoor AttackTuan Anh Nguyen, Anh Tuan TranNeurIPS 2020 · 被引用 601 次
- Blind Backdoors in Deep Learning ModelsEugene Bagdasaryan, Vitaly ShmatikovUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 372 次
- Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is PracticalNicholas Carlini, Matthew Jagielski, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Daniel Paleka 等S&P 2024 · 被引用 309 次
- Demon in the Variant: Statistical Analysis of DNNs for Robust Backdoor Contamination DetectionDi Tang, XiaoFeng Wang, Haixu Tang, Kehuan ZhangUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 242 次
- BadEncoder: Backdoor Attacks to Pre-trained Encoders in Self-Supervised LearningJinyuan Jia, Yupei Liu, Neil Zhenqiang GongS&P 2022 · 被引用 200 次
它引用的顶会 Paper6
- Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural NetworksBolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 1,801 次
- Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural NetworksWeilin Xu, David Evans, Yanjun QiNDSS 2018 · 被引用 1,633 次
- Trojaning Attack on Neural NetworksYingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee 等NDSS 2018 · 被引用 1,377 次
- Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression LearningMatthew Jagielski, Alina Oprea, Battista Biggio, Chang Liu 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 867 次
- NIC: Detecting Adversarial Samples with Neural Network Invariant CheckingShiqing Ma, Yingqi Liu, Guanhong Tao, Wen-Chuan Lee 等NDSS 2019 · 被引用 283 次
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