CONFIRM: Evaluating Compatibility and Relevance of Control-flow Integrity Protections for Modern Software
Xiaoyang Xu, Masoud Ghaffarinia, Wenhao Wang, Kevin W. Hamlen, Zhiqiang Lin
摘要
CONFIRM (CONtrol-Flow Integrity Relevance Metrics) is a new evaluation methodology and microbenchmarking suite for assessing compatibility, applicability, and relevance of control-flow integrity (CFI) protections for preserving the intended semantics of software while protecting it from abuse. Although CFI has become a mainstay of protecting certain classes of software from code-reuse attacks, and continues to be improved by ongoing research, its ability to preserve intended program functionalities (semantic transparency) of diverse, mainstream software products has been under-studied in the literature. This is in part because although CFI solutions are evaluated in terms of performance and security, there remains no standard regimen for assessing compatibility. Researchers must often therefore resort to anecdotal assessments, consisting of tests on homogeneous software collections with limited variety (e.g., GNU Coreutils), or on CPU benchmarks (e.g., SPEC) whose limited code features are not representative of large, mainstream software products. Reevaluation of CFI solutions using CONFIRM reveals that there remain significant unsolved challenges in securing many large classes of software products with CFI, including software for market-dominant OSes (e.g., Windows) and code employing certain ubiquitous coding idioms (e.g., eventdriven callbacks and exceptions). An estimated 47% of CFIrelevant code features with high compatibility impact remain incompletely supported by existing CFI algorithms, or receive weakened controls that leave prevalent threats unaddressed (e.g., return-oriented programming attacks). Discussion of these open problems highlights issues that future research must address to bridge these important gaps between CFI theory and practice.
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引用它的顶会 Paper12
- PACStack: an Authenticated Call StackHans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn, Jan-Erik Ekberg 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 63 次
- Finding Cracks in Shields: On the Security of Control Flow Integrity MechanismsYuan Li, Mingzhe Wang, Chao Zhang, Xingman Chen 等CCS 2020 · 被引用 32 次
- Validating the Integrity of Audit Logs Against Execution Repartitioning AttacksCarter Yagemann, Mohammad A. Noureddine, Wajih Ul Hassan, Simon P. Chung 等CCS 2021 · 被引用 17 次
- On Bridging the Gap between Control Flow Integrity and Attestation SchemesMahmoud Ammar, Ahmed Abdelraoof, Silviu VlasceanuUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 9 次
- Burn after reading: a shadow stack with microsecond-level runtime rerandomization for protecting return addressesChangwei Zou, Jingling XueICSE 2020 · 被引用 6 次
它引用的顶会 Paper9
- C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems SoftwareTigist Abera, N. Asokan, Lucas Davi, Jan-Erik Ekberg 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 311 次
- A Tough Call: Mitigating Advanced Code-Reuse Attacks at the Binary LevelVictor van der Veen, Enes Göktas, Moritz Contag, Andre Pawlowski 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 227 次
- Enforcing Unique Code Target Property for Control-Flow IntegrityHong Hu, Chenxiong Qian, Carter Yagemann, Simon Pak Ho Chung 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 142 次
- Efficient Protection of Path-Sensitive Control SecurityRen Ding, Chenxiong Qian, Chengyu Song, William Harris 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 123 次
- Superset Disassembly: Statically Rewriting x86 Binaries Without HeuristicsErick Bauman, Zhiqiang Lin, Kevin W. HamlenNDSS 2018 · 被引用 112 次
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