Burn after reading: a shadow stack with microsecond-level runtime rerandomization for protecting return addresses
Changwei Zou, Jingling Xue
摘要
Return-oriented programming (ROP) is an effective code-reuse attack in which short code sequences (i.e., gadgets) ending in a ret instruction are found within existing binaries and then executed by taking control of the call stack. The shadow stack, control flow integrity (CFI) and code (re)randomization are three popular techniques for protecting programs against return address overwrites. However, existing runtime rerandomization techniques operate on concrete return addresses, requiring expensive pointer tracking. By adding one level of indirection, we introduce BarRA, the first shadow stack mechanism that applies continuous runtime rerandomization to abstract return addresses for protecting their corresponding concrete return addresses (protected also by CFI), thus avoiding expensive pointer tracking. As a nice side-effect, BarRA naturally combines the shadow stack, CFI and runtime rerandomization in the same framework. The key novelty of BarRA, however, is that once some abstract return addresses are leaked, BarRA will enforce the burn-after-reading property by rerandomizing the mapping from the abstract to the concrete return address space in the order of microseconds instead of seconds required for rerandomizing a concrete return address space. As a result, BarRA can be used as a superior replacement for the shadow stack, as demonstrated by comparing both using the 19 C/C++ benchmarks in SPEC CPU2006 (totalling 2,047,447 LOC) and analyzing a proof-of-concept attack, provided that we can tolerate some slight binary code size increases (by an average of 29.44%) and are willing to use 8MB of dedicated memory for holding up to 2 20 return addresses (on a 64-bit platform). Under an information leakage attack (for some return addresses), the shadow stack is always vulnerable but BarRA is significantly more resilient (by reducing an attacker's success rate to 1 2 20 on average). In terms of the average performance overhead introduced, both are comparable: 6.09% (BarRA) vs. 5.38% (the shadow stack).
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它引用的顶会 Paper8
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- Superset Disassembly: Statically Rewriting x86 Binaries Without HeuristicsErick Bauman, Zhiqiang Lin, Kevin W. HamlenNDSS 2018 · 被引用 112 次
- How to Make ASLR Win the Clone Wars: Runtime Re-RandomizationKangjie Lu, Wenke Lee, Stefan Nürnberger, Michael BackesNDSS 2016 · 被引用 96 次
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