AutoRFM: Scaling Low-Cost in-DRAM Trackers to Ultra-Low Rowhammer Thresholds
Moinuddin Qureshi
摘要
In-DRAM Rowhammer mitigation has the potential to solve the Rowhammer problem without relying on other parts of the system. In-DRAM mitigation requires space (to identify the aggressor rows) and time (to perform the victim refresh). To reduce the storage overheads of tracking, recent works have developed secure low-cost in-DRAM trackers that can probabilistically identify aggressor rows. To obtain the time required for mitigation, these trackers rely on the Refresh Management (RFM) command introduced in DDR5. As RFM stalls the bank for a latency of 200ns-400ns, frequent use of RFM can cause significant slowdowns. For example, scaling the recent MINT tracker to a threshold of 100 incurs 33% slowdown. The goal of this paper is to enable low-cost trackers to tolerate ultralow thresholds (sub-100) while incurring negligible slowdown.
This paper proposes AutoRFM, a transparent RFM mechanism that can provide mitigation time to the DRAM chips without stalling the bank. The key insight in AutoRFM is to leverage the subarray structure (e.g. each bank contains 256 subarrays) and perform mitigation on only one of the subarrays. Operations to all subarrays that are not under mitigation are serviced without any interruption. If activation occurs to the subarray under mitigation, the DRAM chip sends an ALERT signal informing the Memory Controller to retry after a predefined time. As AutoRFM works best if consecutive requests to the same bank do not get mapped to the same subarray, we use Randomized Memory Mapping to break the spatial correlation between memory accesses. Furthermore, we also develop a Fractal Mitigation Algorithm that can tolerate transitive attacks (such as Half-Double) without requiring recursive mitigations to the same subarray. Our design ensures that a declined request does not have to wait more than 200 ns before retrying, thus limiting the slowdown and avoiding any potential for denial of service. Our evaluations, with SPEC, GAP, and stream workloads, show that AutoRFM enables low-cost trackers to tolerate a threshold of as low as 74 while incurring an average slowdown of only 3.1%. Row Row Row Ref Track In-DRAM Mitigation Ref Goal Slowdown 30% 0% 800 Threshold over time 400 200 100 50
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper10
- Chronus: Understanding and Securing the Cutting-Edge Industry Solutions to DRAM Read DisturbanceOguzhan Canpolat, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Ataberk Olgun 等HPCA 2025 · 被引用 23 次
- ColumnDisturb: Understanding Column-based Read Disturbance in Real DRAM Chips and Implications for Future SystemsIsmail Emir Yuksel, Ataberk Olgun, Nisa Bostanci, Haocong Luo 等MICRO 2025 · 被引用 15 次
- DREAM: Enabling Low-Overhead Rowhammer Mitigation via Directed Refresh ManagementHritvik Taneja, Moinuddin K. QureshiISCA 2025 · 被引用 9 次
- Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer DefensesF. Nisa Bostanci, Oguzhan Canpolat, Ataberk Olgun, Ismail Emir Yüksel 等MICRO 2025 · 被引用 8 次
- When Mitigations Backfire: Timing Channel Attacks and Defense for PRAC-Based RowHammer MitigationsJeonghyun Woo, Joyce Qu, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant Jayaprakash NairISCA 2025 · 被引用 6 次
它引用的顶会 Paper33
- Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile PlatformsVictor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 381 次
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 288 次
- TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row RefreshPietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 274 次
- RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing ThemAndrew Kwong, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Yuval YaromS&P 2020 · 被引用 239 次
- Exploiting Correcting Codes: On the Effectiveness of ECC Memory Against Rowhammer AttacksLucian Cojocar, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert BosS&P 2019 · 被引用 233 次
相关 Paper
- MINT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with a Minimalist in-DRAM TrackerMoinuddin Qureshi, Salman Qazi, Aamer JaleelMICRO 2024 · 被引用 28 次
- PrIDE: Achieving Secure Rowhammer Mitigation with Low-Cost In-DRAM TrackersAamer Jaleel, Gururaj Saileshwar, Stephen W. Keckler, Moinuddin K. QureshiISCA 2024 · 被引用 22 次
- APT: Securing Against DRAM Read Disturbance via Adaptive Probabilistic In-DRAM TrackersRunjin Wu, Meng Zhang, You Zhou, Changsheng Xie 等ASPLOS 2026 · 被引用 2 次
- Hydra: enabling low-overhead mitigation of row-hammer at ultra-low thresholds via hybrid trackingMoinuddin K. Qureshi, Aditya Rohan, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant J. NairISCA 2022 · 被引用 60 次
- DAPPER: A Performance-Attack-Resilient Tracker for RowHammer DefenseJeonghyun Woo, Prashant J. NairHPCA 2025 · 被引用 10 次
