MoPAC: Efficiently Mitigating Rowhammer with Probabilistic Activation Counting
Suhas Vittal, Salman Qazi, Poulami Das, Moinuddin Qureshi
摘要
Rowhammer has worsened over the last decade. Existing in-DRAM solutions, such as TRR, were broken with simple patterns. In response, the recent DDR5 JEDEC standards modify the DRAM array to enable Per-Row Activation Counters (PRAC) for tracking aggressor rows. They also extend the DRAM timings to support the operations required to update the PRAC counters. Unfortunately, the increased memory timings cause significant performance overheads (on average 10%) even for benign applications and even at current Rowhammer thresholds. The goal of this paper is to minimize the slowdown of PRAC while retaining the security benefits of PRAC.
This paper proposes Mitigating Rowhammer with Probabilistic Activation Counts (MoPAC), which reduces the slowdown of updating the PRAC counters by performing the updates probabilistically, thereby incurring the latency overhead of counter updates for only a small subset of activations. To ensure security in the presence of probabilistic counters, MOPAC adjusts the threshold at which the row undergoes mitigation. We propose two variants of MoPAC: MoPAC-C (Memory-Controller Side) and MoPAC-D (DRAM Side).
MoPAC-C relies on having two types of precharge commands: one that incurs normal latency and does not do counter updates, and the other that incurs higher latency and performs counter updates. MoPAC-C probabilistically chooses when the longer precharge must be used to perform update of the PRAC counter. MoPAC-D is a completely in-DRAM solution that probabilistically selects which activations will be selected for performing counter updates and obtains the time required for counter-updates using ALERT or REF. Our evaluations show that, for a Rowhammer threshold of 500 (10× lower than current thresholds), MoPAC-C and MoPAC-D incur an average slowdown of only 1.7% and 0.7%, much less than the 10% incurred by PRAC. MoPAC removes one of the major obstacles to the commercial adoption of PRAC.
• Security and privacy → Security in hardware.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper9
- Chronus: Understanding and Securing the Cutting-Edge Industry Solutions to DRAM Read DisturbanceOguzhan Canpolat, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Ataberk Olgun 等HPCA 2025 · 被引用 23 次
- ColumnDisturb: Understanding Column-based Read Disturbance in Real DRAM Chips and Implications for Future SystemsIsmail Emir Yuksel, Ataberk Olgun, Nisa Bostanci, Haocong Luo 等MICRO 2025 · 被引用 15 次
- Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer DefensesF. Nisa Bostanci, Oguzhan Canpolat, Ataberk Olgun, Ismail Emir Yüksel 等MICRO 2025 · 被引用 8 次
- GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using RowhammerChris S. Lin, Yuqin Yan, Guozhen Ding, Joyce Qu 等S&P 2026 · 被引用 8 次
- PVAC: A Rowhammer Mitigation Architecture Exploiting Per-Victim-Row CountingJumin Kim, Seungmin Baek, Hwayong Nam, Minbok Wi 等ISCA 2026 · 被引用 5 次
它引用的顶会 Paper27
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 288 次
- TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row RefreshPietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 274 次
- RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing ThemAndrew Kwong, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Yuval YaromS&P 2020 · 被引用 239 次
- Revisiting RowHammer: An Experimental Analysis of Modern DRAM Devices and Mitigation TechniquesJeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Abdullah Giray Yaglikçi, Hasan Hassan 等ISCA 2020 · 被引用 161 次
- SMASH: Synchronized Many-sided Rowhammer Attacks from JavaScriptFinn de Ridder, Pietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Herbert Bos 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 124 次
相关 Paper
- QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority QueuesJeonghyun Woo, Shaopeng Chris Lin, Prashant J. Nair, Aamer Jaleel 等HPCA 2025 · 被引用 20 次
- MOAT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with Per-Row Activation CountersMoinuddin Qureshi, Salman QaziASPLOS 2025 · 被引用 19 次
- When Mitigations Backfire: Timing Channel Attacks and Defense for PRAC-Based RowHammer MitigationsJeonghyun Woo, Joyce Qu, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant Jayaprakash NairISCA 2025 · 被引用 6 次
- Loaded Dice: Solving the Non-Selection Problem for Scalable Probabilistic RowHammer DefenseJeonghyun Woo, Junsu Kim, Aamer Jaleel, Prashant J. NairISCA 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- REGA: Scalable Rowhammer Mitigation with Refresh-Generating ActivationsMichele Marazzi, Flavien Solt, Patrick Jattke, Kubo Takashi 等S&P 2023
