Cloudy with a Chance of Cyberattacks: Dangling Resources Abuse on Cloud Platforms
Jens Frieß, Tobias Gattermayer, Nethanel Gelernter, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
摘要
Recent works showed that it is feasible to hijack resources on cloud platforms. In such hijacks, attackers can take over released resources that belong to legitimate organizations. It was proposed that adversaries could abuse these resources to carry out attacks against customers of the hijacked services, e.g., through malware distribution. However, to date, no research has confirmed the existence of these attacks.
We identify, for the first time, real-life hijacks of cloud resources. This yields a number of surprising and important insights. First, contrary to previous assumption that attackers primarily target IP addresses, our findings reveal that the type of resource is not the main consideration in a hijack. Attackers focus on hijacking records that allow them to determine the resource by entering freetext. The costs and overhead of hijacking such records are much lower than those of hijacking IP addresses, which are randomly selected from a large pool.
Second, identifying hijacks poses a substantial challenge. Monitoring resource changes, e.g., changes in content, is insufficient, since such changes could also be legitimate. Retrospective analysis of digital assets to identify hijacks is also arduous due to the immense volume of data involved and the absence of indicators to search for. To address this challenge, we develop a novel approach that involves analyzing data from diverse sources to effectively differentiate between malicious and legitimate modifications. Our analysis has revealed 20,904 instances of hijacked resources on popular cloud platforms. While some hijacks are short-lived (up to 15 days), 1 3 persist for more than 65 days.
We study how attackers abuse the hijacked resources and find that, in contrast to the threats considered in previous work, the majority of the abuse (75%) is blackhat search engine optimization. We also find fraudulent certificates and stolen cookies. We cluster the abuse resources and abuse content to identify about 1,800 individual attacking infrastructures.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper8
- Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against ManipulationVictor Le Pochat, Tom van Goethem, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Maciej Korczynski 等NDSS 2019 · 被引用 826 次
- All Things Considered: An Analysis of IoT Devices on Home NetworksDeepak Kumar, Kelly Shen, Benton Case, Deepali Garg 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 189 次
- The Circle Of Life: A Large-Scale Study of The IoT Malware LifecycleOmar Alrawi, Charles Lever, Kevin Valakuzhy, Ryan Court 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 109 次
- All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS RecordsDaiping Liu, Shuai Hao, Haining WangCCS 2016 · 被引用 91 次
- Cloud Strife: Mitigating the Security Risks of Domain-Validated CertificatesKevin Borgolte, Tobias Fiebig, Shuang Hao, Christopher Kruegel 等NDSS 2018 · 被引用 63 次
相关 Paper
- The Hijackers Guide To The Galaxy: Off-Path Taking Over Internet ResourcesTianxiang Dai, Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Michael WaidnerUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 22 次
- Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting ReferralEihal Alowaisheq, Siyuan Tang, Zhihao Wang, Fatemah Alharbi 等CCS 2020 · 被引用 19 次
- Rethinking the Security Threats of Stale DNS Glue RecordsYunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, Haixin Duan, Min Zhang 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 9 次
- Measuring and Mitigating the Risk of IP Reuse on Public CloudsEric Pauley, Ryan Sheatsley, Blaine Hoak, Quinn Burke 等S&P 2022 · 被引用 22 次
- The Cookie Hunter: Automated Black-box Auditing for Web Authentication and Authorization FlawsKostas Drakonakis, Sotiris Ioannidis, Jason PolakisCCS 2020 · 被引用 56 次
