Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting Referral
Eihal Alowaisheq, Siyuan Tang, Zhihao Wang, Fatemah Alharbi, Xiaojing Liao, XiaoFeng Wang
摘要
In recent years, the security implication of stale NS records, which point to a nameserver that no longer resolves the domain, has been unveiled. Prior research studied the stale DNS records that point to expired domains. The popularity of DNS hosting services brings in a new category of stale NS records, which reside in the domain's zone (instead of the TLD zone) for an active domain. To the best of our knowledge, the security risk of this kind of stale NS record has never been studied before. In our research, we show that this new type of stale NS record can be practically exploited, causing a stealthier hijack of domains associated with the DNS hosting service. We also performed a large-scale analysis on over 1M high-profile domains, 17 DNS hosting providers and 12 popular public resolver operators to confirm the prevalence of this security risk. Our research further discovers 628 hijackable domains (e.g., 6 government entities and 2 payment services), 14 affected DNS hosting providers (e.g., Amazon Route 53), and 10 vulnerable public resolver operators (e.g., CloudFlare). Furthermore, we conducted an in-depth measurement analysis on them, thus providing a better understanding of this new security risk. Also, we explore the mitigation techniques that can be adopted by different affected parties.
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引用它的顶会 Paper9
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- Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Detecting Orphaned Web Pages at Internet-ScaleStijn Pletinckx, Kevin Borgolte, Tobias FiebigCCS 2021 · 被引用 11 次
- Rethinking the Security Threats of Stale DNS Glue RecordsYunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, Haixin Duan, Min Zhang 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 9 次
它引用的顶会 Paper6
- Global Measurement of DNS ManipulationPaul Pearce, Ben Jones, Frank Li, Roya Ensafi 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 163 次
- All Your DNS Records Point to Us: Understanding the Security Threats of Dangling DNS RecordsDaiping Liu, Shuai Hao, Haining WangCCS 2016 · 被引用 91 次
- Who Is Answering My Queries: Understanding and Characterizing Interception of the DNS Resolution PathBaojun Liu, Chaoyi Lu, Hai-Xin Duan, Ying Liu 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 67 次
- Cloud Strife: Mitigating the Security Risks of Domain-Validated CertificatesKevin Borgolte, Tobias Fiebig, Shuang Hao, Christopher Kruegel 等NDSS 2018 · 被引用 63 次
- Don't Let One Rotten Apple Spoil the Whole Barrel: Towards Automated Detection of Shadowed DomainsDaiping Liu, Zhou Li, Kun Du, Haining Wang 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 60 次
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