All Your Shops Are Belong to Us: Security Weaknesses in E-commerce Platforms
Rohan Pagey, Mohammad Mannan, Amr M. Youssef
摘要
Software as a Service (SaaS) e-commerce platforms for merchants allow individual business owners to set up their online stores almost instantly. Prior work has shown that the checkout flows and payment integration of some e-commerce applications are vulnerable to logic bugs with serious financial consequences, e.g., allowing "shopping for free". Apart from checkout and payment integration, vulnerabilities in other e-commerce operations have remained largely unexplored, even though they can have far more serious consequences, e.g., enabling "store takeover". In this work, we design and implement a security evaluation framework to uncover security vulnerabilities in e-commerce operations beyond checkout/payment integration. We use this framework to analyze 32 representative e-commerce platforms, including web services of 24 commercial SaaS platforms and 15 associated Android apps, and 8 open source platforms; these platforms host over 10 million stores as approximated through Google dorks. We uncover several new vulnerabilities with serious consequences, e.g., allowing an attacker to take over all stores under a platform, and listing illegal products at a victim's store-in addition to "shopping for free" bugs, without exploiting the checkout/payment process. We found 12 platforms vulnerable to store takeover (affecting 41000+ stores) and 6 platforms vulnerable to shopping for free (affecting 19000+ stores, approximated via Google dorks on Oct. 8, 2022). We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to all affected parties, and requested four CVEs (three assigned, and one is pending review). CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Web application security.
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