Towards Automated Auditing for Account and Session Management Flaws in Single Sign-On Deployments
Mohammad Ghasemisharif, Chris Kanich, Jason Polakis
摘要
Single Sign-On (SSO) is both a core and critical component of user authentication and authorization on the modern web, as it is often offered by web and mobile applications alongside credential-based authentication to facilitate the account creation and login process. However, the interplay between local account management and SSO functionality in the backend leads to flaws that enable or magnify account hijacking attacks. These flaws are not baked into the actual SSO protocols, but manifest due to the complexity of supporting separate but intermingling authentication paths. As a result, these types of flaws cannot be detected by the SSO protocol or implementation verification tools proposed in prior work. In this paper we introduce SAAT, a fully automated modular framework that assesses whether relying parties (RPs) that use Facebook as the IdP comply with secure practices and guidelines, and uncovers flaws in account and session management that stem from or are affected by the interplay of SSO and local functionality. We conduct a large-scale exploration of authentication and session practices in Facebook’s RPs, revealing a volatile ecosystem where SSO support can be suddenly dropped and 17.6% of the tested RPs exhibit non-functional SSO implementations. This highlights the need for the continuous and systematic testing of the SSO ecosystem made possible by SAAT. More critically, we find that security measures are often missing and official guidelines are routinely overlooked or misconfigured, with only 0.8% of the RPs fully enabling re-authentication which can prevent compromise from hijacked identity provider (IdP) cookies. Our study also shows that less than 2% of RPs correctly react to SSO revocation and 67% continue to allow account access even 10 days after revocation. Overall, we envision our framework as a tool for enabling and guiding widespread remediation efforts by major SSO identity providers, which were previously infeasible due to the sheer scale and inherent mutability of this ecosystem.
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