Efficient Branch-and-Bound Testing and Verification of zkVMs
Hideaki Takahashi, Suman Jana, Junfeng Yang
摘要
Zero-knowledge virtual machines (zkVMs) enable verifiable execution of general-purpose programs by translating virtual machine semantics into algebraic constraints over execution traces. The correctness of these constraints is critical: a single missing or incorrect constraint can admit forged proofs (under-constrained) or reject valid executions (over-constrained). Existing approaches do not provide meaningful guarantees at production scale: fuzzers and unit tests often miss bugs, SMT solvers struggle with the size and nonlinearity of constraints, and theorem provers require substantial manual effort.
We present ZEBRA, a fully automated verification and bugdetection framework grounded in a precise correctness criterion: for a given program and input, the constraint system must admit exactly one valid execution trace-no more (soundness) and no fewer (completeness). This reduces zkVM verification to a solution-set cardinality problem over a canonical trace space, where redundancies such as null-row padding and non-deterministic permutations are eliminated prior to counting.
To compute cardinality tractably, ZEBRA lifts analysis from finite-field witnesses to an integer interval lattice, exploiting a structural sparsity property of zkVM constraints: across 5 realworld zkVMs, constraints utilize only 14.0% of their theoretical connectivity capacity on average. This sparsity enables tight interval propagation with limited over-approximation error. ZEBRA performs a parallel branch-and-bound search that, unlike fuzzing, either produces a concrete counterexample or certifies the absence of violations within a bounded input region.
We evaluate ZEBRA on five real-world zkVMs. ZEBRA discovers 11 previously unknown vulnerabilities, including critical flaws enabling control-flow hijacking and proof forgery-none detected by a state-of-the-art fuzzer; 6 have already been independently confirmed and 3 have been fixed by developers. Compared to SMTbased verification, ZEBRA is 51.5× faster, verifies 16.5 percentage point more instances, and its range verification provides up to 63× efficiency gain over repeated single-input verification.
• Security and privacy → Software security engineering; Cryptanalysis and other attacks.
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它引用的顶会 Paper4
- Practical Security Analysis of Zero-Knowledge Proof CircuitsHongbo Wen, Jon Stephens, Yanju Chen, Kostas Ferles 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 31 次
- Automated Detection of Under-Constrained Circuits in Zero-Knowledge ProofsShankara Pailoor, Yanju Chen, Franklyn Wang, Clara Rodríguez-Núñez 等PLDI 2023 · 被引用 24 次
- zkFuzz: Foundation and Framework for Effective Fuzzing of Zero-Knowledge CircuitsHideaki Takahashi, Jihwan Kim, Suman Jana, Junfeng YangS&P 2026 · 被引用 8 次
- Arguzz: Testing zkVMs for Soundness and Completeness BugsChristoph Hochrainer, Valentin Wüstholz, Maria ChristakisUSENIX Security 2026 · 被引用 2 次
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